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ARTICLES
FACILITATING CRIMES: AN INQUIRY INTO THE SELECTIVE




Conventional wisdom holds that all crimes run a gauntlet of procedures
that begins with an investigation and arrest, leads to charging and
arraignment, and culminates (at least in successful prosecutions) with a
conviction and the application of punishment. The reality is more
complicated; in fact, there exist "detention crimes, " "charging crimes, "
and "pleading crimes," three types of offenses that, as applied, tend to
implicate only portions of this sequence. This Article examines the three
categories of 'facilitating crimes" and the benefits and drawbacks
associated with their use. On the one hand, these offenses may permit
more nuanced treatment of specific types of misconduct; on the other, the
legitimacy of these offenses may be compromised by their failure to engage
the entire "traditional" procedural continuum. This Article concludes
that while facilitating crimes and the practices that produce them raise
significant concerns, "opt-in" and "opt-out" offenses-two species of
crimes that would give defendants a greater role in avoiding portions of
the continuum-might be considered as replacements for some
conventional crimes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Some crimes provide the basis for many plea bargains, but relatively
few arrests. For example, each year in North Carolina thousands of
motorists plead guilty to driving with a broken speedometer.' Virtually
none of these defendants have been charged with this offense, and it is
unlikely that many of them have broken speedometers in their vehicles.
Instead, almost all of these individuals have been cited for a moving
violation, such as speeding.! In each case, the original charge is dropped
pursuant to an agreement whereby the defendant pleads guilty to the
very dubious broken-speedometer offense, which carries a lesser penalty
than a conviction on the original charge would. On the other side of the
country, California courts and practitioners recognize an offense known
as the "wet reckless," shorthand for "wet reckless driving."' As a matter of
' Editorial, Busted, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 18, 2007, at A12
(relating that in the year ending June 30, 2006, "the state suffered 222,254 cases of
broken speedometers"); Pat Stith, David Raynor & Mandy Locke, Speeders Race
Through Loopholes, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 17, 2007, at Al (discussing
the use of the "broken speedometer" offense as a basis for plea bargains in speeding
cases). The crime of driving with a broken speedometer is codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 20-123.2 (2009) (providing that "[e]very self-propelled motor vehicle when
operated on the highway shall be equipped with a speedometer which shall be
maintained in good working order"). Violation of this law is punishable by a fine not
to exceed $25, and a conviction does not result in any "points" being added to the
defendant's driving record. Id. § 20-123-2(b). For a discussion of this Article's
nuanced definition of "crime," see infra note 46.
2 See Editorial, supra note 1 (expressing skepticism at the number of North
Carolina motorists who claim to have defective speedometers in their vehicles).
Id. Other jurisdictions likewise recognize crimes that support a large number of
factually unfounded plea agreements. Mari Byrne, Note, Baseless Pleas: A Mockery of
justice, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2961, 2988-89 (2010) (discussing a variety of crimes that
undergird factually "baseless" pleas).
4 Editorial, supra note 1.
' See CAL. VEH. CODE § 23103.5 (West 2000) (providing that a conviction for
reckless driving, reduced from a charge of driving under the influence of drugs or
alcohol (DUI), shall count as a "prior" DUI conviction if the prosecutor relates on the
record that the reckless driving was accompanied by the consumption of drugs or
alcohol by the motorist); People v. Forrester, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 740, 742 n.2 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2007) (referring to a conviction pursuant to the process created by section
23103.5 of the California Vehicle Code as a "wet reckless"); Walker v. Kiousis, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 69, 74 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (same).
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law, a law enforcement officer cannot arrest someone for a wet reckless.
The wet reckless cannot be alleged by a prosecutor in an initial charging
instrument, and it cannot be tried before ajury. The sole function of the
wet reckless offense is to provide a landing point6 for plea bargains in
cases in which a motorist has been charged with driving under the
influence of drugs or alcohol.'
At the other extreme, some crimes lead to many detentions or initial
charges, but relatively few convictions. Not long ago, numerous
jurisdictions aggressively leveraged the discretion that broadly worded
vagrancy, loitering, and disorderly conduct crimes conferred upon law
enforcement. Police used these and similar offenses to detain persons
suspected of other crimes, to inflict shaming punishments through
public arrests, and to facilitate officers' community caretaking duties, as
these responsibilities were understood in that era." Yet many of these
same cities and counties systematically declined to prosecute individuals
arrested for one of these crimes.9 The primary function of these offenses
was to enable detentions, not to produce convictions and resulting
punishment. Another type of crime without convictions implicates
modem reliance on plea bargaining for the disposition of criminal cases:
certain offenses within the criminal codes seem to exist principally so
that prosecutors can charge them and then bargain them away in plea
negotiations that permit defendants to plead guilty or no contest to other
crimes.
In other words, some crimes do not have to implicate the entire
sequence of procedures conventionally associated with criminal
offenses-from investigation and arrest to sentencing and appeal-in
order to contribute, in some fashion, to the enforcement of a general
prohibition scheme. As the foregoing examples suggest, these
"facilitating crimes" fall into one of three categories. "Detention crimes"
bring about many short-term restraints on liberty, but are rarely charged
and even more infrequently prosecuted to conviction. "Charging crimes"
are pled down or dismissed-by design-in a significant percentage of
the cases in which they are originally alleged. Finally, "pleading crimes"
6 This Article borrows the "landing points" phrase, which describes the crime or
crimes to which a defendant enters a guilty or no-contest plea as part of a plea
bargain with the prosecution, from Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, The Effects
of Depth and Distance in a Criminal Code on Charging Sentencing and Prosecutor Power, 84
N.C. L. REv. 1935, 1940 (2006) [hereinafter Wright & Engen, The Effects of Depth and
Distance].
' A defendant who pleads guilty to a wet reckless escapes the gamut of penalties
associated with a conviction for driving under the influence. Compare CAL. VEH. CODE
§§ 23103(c), 23103.5(e) (West 2000) (prescribing the penalties associated with a first-
time conviction for a "wet reckless"), with CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 23536, 23538 (West
2000) (prescribing the penalties associated with a first-time conviction for driving
under the influence of drugs or alcohol).
' See infra text accompanying notes 47-86.
9 See infra text accompanying notes 90-106.
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such as the wet reckless rise to the forefront of criminal cases most often
pursuant to plea agreements in which the prosecution agrees to dismiss
or reduce other charges. Though they represent only small segments of
any criminal code, detention, charging, and pleading crimes all serve
important purposes. If each criminal case represents a play, these three
types of crimes might be likened to actors that appear only in brief
scenes, but have crucial roles in driving the plot forward.
Facilitating crimes owe their existence to some very basic
characteristics of the lawmaking process and the criminal justice system.
There exist strong political pressures to create new crimes, few
meaningful constraints on the legislative imagination in fashioning these
offenses (and their associated penalties)," and little subsequent review of
the wisdom and efficacy of the prohibitions that are enacted. 2 These
conditions have produced voluminous criminal codes replete with
overlapping offenses," which vary along many dimensions, including
their susceptibility to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the penalties
that adhere upon conviction," and the costs associated with investigation
and trial. Law enforcement officers, meanwhile, are vested with
enormous discretion to enforce this jumble of criminal laws," yet remain
subject to resource constraints that prevent full prosecution of each and
every offense." These circumstances provide police and prosecutors with
multiple opportunities (and significant incentives) to select, from the
constellation of offenses that often apply to a single course of conduct,
the crimes that will most economically and effectively facilitate their
'o Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REv. 703, 719
(2005); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 529-33 (2001) [hereinafter Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law];
William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 1, 9-10 (1996) [hereinafter Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal
Line].
" Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Ciminal Line, supra note 10, at 5.
12 Luna, supra note 10, at 724-25 ("[T]he courts have been hesitant to limit the
political branches in their enactment and enforcement of substantive crimes and
punishments.").
' Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, supra note 10, at 513-19; Paul H.
Robinson, Michael T. Cahill & Usman Mohammad, The Five Worst (and Five Best)
American Criminal Codes, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 36-38 (2000) (discussing overlapping
crimes in state criminal codes).
" See JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL
ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS 235 (1977) ("While every offense must be proved
'beyond a reasonable doubt,' the statutory provisions of the criminal code require
varying kinds of evidence that make some crimes easier to prove than others.").
" Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, supra note 10, at 552.
1 Erin Murphy, Manufacturing Crime: Process, Pretext, and CriminalJustice, 97 GEO.
L.J. 1435, 1495 (2009).
17 Luna, sup-a note 10, at 725-26.
'8 See Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, supra note 10, at 538
(observing that "[liocal prosecutors have too many cases and too little time" to try
each one).
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efforts at different junctures in the investigation and prosecution of a
criminal case. In a given matter, one offense may provide the basis for an
initial detention; the resulting investigation may lead to the filing of
altogether different charges; and these allegations ultimately may be
rejected in favor of a distinct bargained-to offense of conviction. When,
across cases, an offense is consistently deployed only in certain phases of
a criminal matter, with an intent that the crime not implicate other
portions of the procedural continuum, it amounts to a facilitating crime.
These crimes, and the practices that produce them, present unique
challenges and opportunities. The chronic avoidance of segments of the
customary procedural sequence" raises significant concerns specific to
each type of facilitating crime: detention crimes may evade judicial
scrutiny; the frequent dismissal or reduction of charging crimes suggests
a lack of sincerity in the underlying criminal sanction; and pleading
crimes may lack an adequate foundation in conventional notions of
wrongful conduct. On the other hand, a possibility exists that by creating
more detention, charging, or pleading crimes, legislatures could decrease
"overcriminalization"-the pervasive seepage of criminal laws and the
threat of state-imposed punishment into every aspect of modern life."'
Before this suggestion is rejected out of hand, one should note the
recent revival of interest in diversion programs2 1 and similar devices that
" It is commonly understood that a basic sequence of procedures adheres to all
criminal proceedings. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAvE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANcYJ. KING,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 1.1, 1.3 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing the "typical" phases of a
criminal proceeding). The description in the text above intentionally omits appeals
and post-conviction proceedings, which also form part of the criminal process but are
not immediately pertinent to this Article. The litany of steps discussed by LaFave et al.
consists of (1) prearrest investigation; (2) arrest; (3) booking; (4) post-arrest
investigation; (5) the decision to charge; (6) filing the complaint; (7) magistrate
review of the arrest; (8) the first appearance; (9) preliminary hearing; (10) grand jury
review; (11) the filing of the indictment or information; (12) arraignment on the
information or indictment; (13) pretrial motions; (14) trial; (15) sentencing; (16)
appeals; and (17) post-conviction remedies. Id. § 1.3.
" See generally DOUGLAS HUsAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW (2008). Erik Luna has described the "overcriminalization" label as
encompassing "(1) untenable offenses; (2) superfluous statutes; (3) doctrines that
overextend culpability; (4) crimes without jurisdictional authority; (5) grossly
disproportionate punishments; and (6) excessive or pretextual enforcement of petty
violations." Luna, supra note 10, at 717. Complaints about perceived
"overcriminalization" are nothing new. See, e.g., THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF
GOVERNMENT 159 (1935) (commenting upon a perceived surfeit of crimes); Sanford
H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SC. 157
(1967); Justin Miller, The Compromise of Criminal Cases, 1 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 17, 19
(1927) (remarking upon the "great increase in the number of acts which society has
chosen to designate as criminal[]" and the "prolific creation of new crimes").
" "Diversion is an intervention that takes place after the criminal process has
been initiated, that is, after arrest but before trial and conviction." John P. Bellassai &
Phyllis N. Segal, Note, Addict Diversion: An Alternative Approach for the Criminal justice
System, 60 GEO. L.J. 667, 673 (1972) (footnote omitted). Cf SamuelJ. Brakel & Galen
R. South, Diversion from the Criminal Process in the Rural Community, 7 AM. CRIM. L.Q.
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follow upon conventional criminal "intake" mechanisms (arrest and
charging), but seek to avoid convictions and resulting punishment. These
efforts suggest that an offense that is engineered to implicate only
portions of the procedural continuum may achieve the social objectives
associated with the criminalization of particular conduct more effectively,
and with fewer collateral costs, than a "traditional" crime that implicates
the gamut of criminal procedures would.
This Article examines detention, charging, and pleading crimes and
offers some observations regarding their implications and possible uses.
Section II of this Article relates the basic notion of a procedural
continuum and its relationship to the essence of a criminal offense.
Sections III, IV, and V introduce detention, charging, and pleading
crimes, respectively, offering evidence as to their existence and
summarizing their distinctive characteristics. With regard to charging
and pleading crimes, this discussion incorporates an original analysis of
all federal district court cases terminated by plea between October 2002
and September 2007. This study reveals that some crimes are almost
never dismissed pursuant to plea deals; others are jettisoned quite often,
year after year, in a manner that suggests (though it admittedly does not
conclusively establish) their use as charging crimes. A few federal
offenses also emerge from this analysis as likely pleading crimes.
Section VI then surveys the problems that facilitating crimes present.
These drawbacks may seem overwhelming, such that detention, charging,
and pleading crimes should almost always be avoided in the first instance
and remedied when detected. The critical view that this Article expresses
toward these offenses falls short of outright condemnation, however.
Section VII, which concludes the piece, considers the possibility that
crimes that parse the procedural continuum may, under certain
conditions, result in the more efficient and compassionate
administration of the criminal law. Here, this Article suggests that
legislatures consider, when enacting new crimes or re-evaluating existing
ones, whether these offenses would realize their aims more effectively as
either "opt-in" crimes, which would resemble pleading offenses but
categorically could not form the basis for an arrest or an initial charge, or
as "opt-out" crimes, in which defendants could avoid the latter stages of
the procedural sequence (trial, conviction, and punishment) through
the completion of certain extrajudicial prerequisites. In certain
situations, it is submitted, these kinds of departures from the traditional
one-size-fits-all procedural continuum may benefit the parties to a
criminal case, and society generally.
122, 124 (1969) ("Diversion, strictly speaking, means moving a person from the
criminal process to some non-criminal process, whether it be a medical or social
agency or simply sending the person home.").
670 [Vol. 15:3
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II. CRIMES AND THE PROCEDURAL CONTINUUM
Because detention, charging, and pleading crimes differ from
conventional crimes in their respective relationships with the procedural
continuum that traditionally applies to criminal offenses, this sequence
represents a logical starting point for discussion.
A. The Procedural Continuum
The basic array of procedures that adheres to the prosecution of a
criminal case has changed only slightly over the past two centuries. In his
Commentaries, first published in 1765, Blackstone referenced "the regular
and ordinary method of proceeding in the courts of criminal
jurisdiction.. . ." This sequence was "distributed under twelve general
heads, following each other in a progressive order: viz. 1. Arrest; 2.
Commitment, and bail; 3. Prosecution; 4. Process; 5. Arraignment, and
it's [sic] incidents; 6. Plea, and issue; 7. Trial, and conviction; 8. Clergy; 9.
Judgment, and it's [sic] consequences; 10. Reversal of judgment; 11.
Reprieve, or pardon; 12. Execution. ... Though some of these "heads"
no longer exist-a modem defendant would be out of luck if he or she
sought the benefit of clergy -the process described by Blackstone
remains essentially intact today. Almost exactly two centuries after
Blackstone put quill to paper, the report of the President's Commission
on Law Enforcement and Administration ofJustice, The Challenge of Crime
in a Free Society, outlined the conventional sequence of criminal
proceedings in very similar terms. The progression related by the report
begins with the commission of a crime, then proceeds to an investigation,
arrest, booking, initial appearance, preliminar hearing, information,
arraignment, trial or guilty plea, and sentencing.
22 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *286.
2 Through benefit of clergy, a defendant convicted of certain crimes could seek
lenient treatment by reading (in the strict form of the procedure) or reciting (in its
more lenient application) Psalm 51 from the Bible ("Have mercy upon me, 0 God,
according to thy loving-kindness: according unto the multitude of thy tender mercies
blot out my transgressions."). LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 43-44 (1993); Newman F. Baker, Benefit of Clergy-A Legal Anomaly,
15 Ky. L.J. 85, 96-97 (1927). The most celebrated case involving benefit of clergy
involved the trial of the British soldiers involved in the Boston Massacre. Convicted of
manslaughter (potentially a capital offense), the soldiers sought and received the
benefit of clergy, and were only branded on their hands as punishment. Jeffrey K
Sawyer, "Benefit of Clergy" in Maryland and Virginia, 34 AM.J. LEG. HisT. 49, 49 (1990).
The procedure was implicitly recognized by the first United States Congress, which
made it unavailable for capital crimes. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 31, 1 Stat. 112,
119 (punishment of certain crimes against the United States). The last published
decision involving the application of benefit of clergy appeared in 1855, in South
Carolina. State v. Bosse, 42 S.C.L. (8 Rich.) 276, 282-83 (1855).
2 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 8-9 (1967).
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As had Blackstone's recitation, this more contemporary description
portrays criminal procedure prior to appeal as a sequential process that
begins with an investigation and arrest and culminates in the sentencing
of a convicted defendant. These and similar overviews of the criminal
justice process" imply that a "successful" prosecution will proceed
through each of the prescribed phases, except to the extent they are
rendered unnecessary by a defendant's decision to avoid them (as by a
guilty or no-contest plea). The continuum is an ideal, naturally. Crimes
go unsolved, police and prosecutors decline to pursue matters, cases are
dismissed or thrown out, juries acquit.6 Yet if the procedural continuum
recognizes departures in individual cases, with a few significant
exceptions," it normally does not permit the fundamental redesign of its
architecture. The rigidity of the basic continuum follows from an
understanding that each of the core procedures is integral to a process
that advances the state's interest in enforcing the substantive criminal
law, but respects and protects the defendant's fundamental rights.
B. The Sequence and Specific Crimes
Because these procedures are regarded as essential to the criminal
process, it is tempting to conclude that they are all fundamental to any
crime. In other words, one might conclude that if a prohibition amounts
to a crime, then it must be subject to the full range of "criminal"
25 See, e.g., Criminal justice System Flowchart, BuREAu OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OFJUSTICE, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/largechart.cfm; LAFAVE, ISRAEL &
KING, supra note 19, §§ 1.1, 1.3 (relating the conventional steps in a criminal
investigation and proceeding); NAT'L COMM'N ON LAw OBSERVANCE AND
ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 16-18 (1931) (discussing the stages of
a typical criminal proceeding); ARTHUR TRAIN, THE PRISONER AT THE BAR 42 (2d ed.
1908) (same).
2 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OFJUSTICE, supra note 24,
at 8-9.
2' The gravity of a crime may affect this process somewhat. Speaking generally,
the more serious the offense at issue, the more extensive the associated procedures.
For example, in the federal courts a felony prosecution must be initiated by a grand
jury indictment, whereas a prosecutor can file an information that alleges only
misdemeanor offenses. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a)-(b).
2 For example, one influential source described the functional "essentials" of a
criminal proceeding as follows: "(1) To bring the accused before or within the power
of the tribunal, (2) a preliminary investigation to insure that the cause is one which
should be prosecuted, (3) notice to the accused of the offense charged, (4)
opportunity to prepare for trial, procure witnesses, and make needed investigations,
(5) a speedy trial, (6) a fair trial before an impartial tribunal, and, (7) one review of
the case as a whole by a suitable appellate tribunal." NAT'L COMM'N ON LAw
OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 25, at 16. This report then addressed the
basic procedural incidents of a criminal prosecution, beginning with arrest and
ending with an appeal, which mapped quite neatly against these "essentials." Id. at
16-18.
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procedures." If these procedures are in some measure inapplicable to a
legal sanction, then the proscription must be regarded as civil in nature,
or its method of administration rejected and the full set of criminal
safeguards applied.
This syllogism finds its strongest support in Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez,30 decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1963. The
Court in Mendoza-Martinez determined that if a legal sanction leads to
state-imposed "punishment," then this punishment can adhere only after
application of the full array of constitutionally compelled safeguards
traditionally associated with criminal proceedings." Provided that one
defines a "crime" as a legal rule, the violation of which can provide
32grounds for "punishment" by the state, and furthermore agrees that
each of the traditional criminal procedures is necessary to vindicate a
fundamental constitutional safeguard,3 3 the Mendoza-Martinez decision
2 See ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAw 12-13 (3d ed. 1982)
("A definition of the term crime cannot practically be separated from the nature of
proceedings used to determine criminal conduct."); Grant Lamond, What Is a Crime?
27 OxFORDJ. LEGAL STUD. 609, 609-10 (2007) (noting that to some observers, "a legal
prohibition is a criminal prohibition when it is subject to criminal proceedings,"
including the incidents of charging, conviction, and sentencing). The reverse
supposition does not hold true, at least to a point; just because the administration of
a particular prohibition entails a subset of the safeguards and procedures associated
with criminal proceedings does not, by itself, mean that the prohibition amounts to a
crime. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 364-65 (1997) (concluding that the
applicability of certain "procedural safeguards traditionally found in criminal trials"
did not transform a sexually violent predator commitment proceeding into a criminal
proceeding); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 371-72 (1986) ('[A state's] decision . . .
to provide some of the safeguards applicable in criminal trials cannot itself turn
[otherwise civil] proceedings into criminal prosecutions requiring the full panoply of
rights applicable there.").
* 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
Id. at 166-68. Defining what "punishment" means in this context has itself
proved to be a difficult task. See generally Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure:
Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775 (1997)
(discussing the complexities of this issue). Since Mendoza-Martinez, the Court has
distinguished between civil consequences and criminal punishments. The civil or
criminal character of a particular sanction is often ascertained though application of
a series of "guideposts" related by the Mendoza-Martinez decision, applied with a
healthy dose of deference to the label that has been affixed to the prohibition by the
relevant legislature. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99-100 (1997) (citing
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69).
2 See HUSAK, supra note 20, at 78 (explaining that laws are "criminal" in nature
when those who break the prescribed rules become subject to state-imposed
punishment); Kyron Huigens, Solving the Williams Puzzle, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1048,
1061 (2005) ("With rare exceptions, a criminal offense is a pre-legal wrong that has
been reduced to discrete elements for purposes of legal decisionmaking pertaining to
legal punishment.").
* See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal justice, 107 YAL L.J. 1, 12 (1997) ("Thus, [criminal] defendants' rights are
really the system's rules, rules that regulate the conduct of the various actors who take
2011] 673
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could be understood as premising the status of an offense as a
"legitimate" crime on its susceptibility to the full range of procedures
conventionally intertwined with criminal proceedings.
When properly read, however, the Mendoza-Martinez decision
announces a rule applicable to criminal proceedings, not necessarily to
specific crimes.34 This distinction is an important one. In concluding that
punishment can follow only after application of a full set of procedural
safeguards, Mendoza-Martinez neither requires nor implies that the full set
of protections (and the procedures that supposedly embrace them)
invariably must attach to the offense of conviction-only that the
safeguards must apply at some point during a prosecution that leads to
punishment. In fact, crimes may be substituted in and out of a criminal
action in a manner consistent with constitutional directives. For example,
uncharged lesser included crimes can be submitted to the jury" even
16
over a defendant's objection. In such a case, the protections guaranteed
by Mendoza-Martinez still adhere to the proceedings in which these crimes
appear,3 even if the full spectrum of criminal procedures is not directly
applied to the specific crimes ultimately associated with conviction and
punishment.
There exist two other reasons why a particular crime need not
implicate all of the procedures traditionally associated with the
enforcement of a criminal rule. First, some of the customary procedures
do not represent constitutionally compelled safeguards, nor are they
essential to the application of punishment. Arrests offer a case in point.
Though it may be useful to permit arrests for criminal offenses, there is
no constitutional or doctrinal directive that makes an arrest a necessary
part of every criminal case. Indeed, several states prohibit police officers
from making custodial arrests of persons suspected of some minor
offenses. Second, criminal defendants may waive constitutional
part in the process by which some criminal defendants are convicted and
punished.").
" It is conceded that if one regards the possibility of punishment as an essential
characteristic of a crime, "pure" detention and charging crimes-offenses that
categorically could not bring about a conviction, or punishment-would lie outside
of the recognized boundaries of the criminal sanction. "Pure" pleading crimes, which
could lead to punishment, stand on a different footing.
*' Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208 (1973).
6 See Harbin v. State, 14 So. 3d 898, 902-03 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008) (listing
decisions so holding).
7 The charging of an offense and the specification therein of the elements that
amount to lesser crimes is generally deemed to give a defendant notice of the
possibility that lesser included offenses will be submitted to the jury. See, e.g., People v.
Wilder, 780 N.W.2d 265, 271 (Mich. 2010).
8 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 352 (2001); Adam J. Breeden,
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista: How Should States Respond to the Supreme Court's Latest
Expansion of Automobile Search & Seizure Law?, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 1395, 1408-09 (2002)
(discussing state laws that prohibit custodial arrests for modest crimes); Surell Brady,
674 [Vol. 15:3
HeinOnline  -- 15 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 674 2011
FACILITATING CRIMES
protections intended for their benefit. Provided that these waivers are
valid, no obvious, categorical constitutional impediment bars recognition
of crimes that must be invited into a case by the defendant, and thus will
never appear during the investigation and charging phases of a criminal
matter.
In any event, regardless of whether a crime must, in theory, implicate
each phase of the procedural continuum, it is manifestly evident that, in
practice, many crimes tend to be invoked only at particular junctures
within this sequence. The next three sections of this Article discuss these
detention, charging, and pleading crimes.
III. DETENTION CRIMES
There exist (and long have existed) crimes that are used principally
to facilitate detentions and arrests, with prosecutions, convictions, and
subsequent punishment for the proscribed conduct representing mere
afterthoughts. These are "detention crimes."
There exist two types of crimes that produce many detentions, but
few charges or convictions. With the first class of offenses, detentions
upon suspicion that the crime has been, is being, or will be committed
commonly lead to evidentiary dead ends.4 0 For these crimes, while
Arrests Without Prosecution and the Fourth Amendment, 59 MD. L. REv. 1, 20-21 (2000)
(surveying state arrest laws).
' A competent defendant can waive his or her rights to counsel, Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938); discovery, United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629-
33 (2002); trial by jury (at least in non-capital cases), Patton v. United States, 281 U.S.
276, 312 (1930); and appeal, United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1326-28 (10th
Cir. 2004),just to name a few of the safeguards afforded for his or her benefit. There
are some protections that are regarded as unwaiveable, though. See, e.g., Zedner v.
United States, 547 U.S. 489, 500-01 (2006) (concluding that defendants may not
preemptively opt-out of the protections afforded by the Speedy Trial Act of 1974);
United States v. Murphy, 483 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding the right to a
unanimous jury verdict (in federal court) to be incapable of waiver). Cf United States
v. De La Garza, 516 F.3d 1266, 1271 (11th Cir. 2008) (observing that the issue of
whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction over a case cannot be waived by the
parties). For a discussion of the waiver doctrine and its limits, see generally Nancy
Jean King, Priceless Process: Nonnegotiable Features of Criminal Litigation, 47 UCLA L. REV.
113 (1999).
* One study of detentions made by the New York City Police Department found
significant differences across crimes in how often stops upon suspicion led to arrests.
Almost one-quarter (24%) of stops for sale or possession of marijuana led to an
arrest, whereas only 2.5% of stops upon suspicion of a weapons offense produced this
result. CIVIL RIGHTS BuREAu, OFFICE OF THE Arr'Y GEN. OF N.Y., THE NEW YORK CITY
POLICE DEPARTMENT'S "STOP & FRISK" PRACTICES 118 (1999) [hereinafter SPITZER
REPORT]. In a somewhat similar vein, a study of felony arrests in New York City in the
1970s found that while 72% of arrests for murder, attempted murder, and non-
negligent homicide led to some sort of criminal conviction, only 41% of arrests for
felony assault resulted in a similar outcome, and only 25% of arrests for rape
produced a conviction of some type. Between these extremes lay arrests for grand
larceny and possession of stolen property (50% of which led to some sort of
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circumstances amounting to reasonable suspicion are commonplace,
more facts-which may not be forthcoming-are necessary to create
probable cause, to convince a prosecutor to file charges, or to convict a
person of the crime.4 1 For example, reasonable suspicion of a concealed-
weapons offense is fairly easy to glean; under the right conditions, a
"suspicious bulge" may suffice. Yet very few of the resulting detentions
actually yield evidence of a weapon. In other words, the law applicable
to these crimes leads to a large number of "false positive" detentions, in
which a dearth of proof means that no charges for the crime ultimately
will follow."
conviction), narcotics felonies (55%), robbery (58%), gambling (60%), burglary
(64%), and forgery (65%). VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, FELONY ARRESTS: THEIR
PROSECUTION AND DISPOSITION IN NEW YORK CITY'S COURTS 8 fig.4 (1977). Of course,
neither rape nor assault is a "detention crime," as this Article defines the term, for
there is no indication that these offenses are systematically used to effect only
detentions or arrests. See also Sadiq Reza, Privacy and the Criminal Arrestee or Suspect: In
Search of a Right, in Need of a Rule, 64 MD. L. REV. 755, 773 (2005) ("Statistics show that
the percentage of state felony cases dismissed after arrest in major urban centers
ranges from 10% for driving-related offenses to 40% for assault cases.").
" With other crimes, the same facts that commonly establish the reasonable
suspicion that justifies a detention also will prove commission of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. With speeding charges, for example, a radar reading and an
officer's accompanying observations normally will justify a stop. In the usual case,
assuming a credible police officer, these same evidentiary facts will suffice to convict
the driver of speeding. If reasonable suspicion exists, so too does proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.
" See Lawrence Rosenthal, Second Amendment Plumbing after Heller: Of Standards of
Scrutiny, Incorporation, Well-Regulated Militias, and Criminal Street Gangs, 41 URB. LAw. 1,
38 & n.201 (2009) (listing decisions in which courts have found reasonable suspicion
to detain someone for a weapons offense); John P. Murrill, Louisiana and the
Justification for a Protective Frisk for Weapons, 54 LA. L. REV. 1369, 1386 & n.89 (1994)
(same). Officers appreciate and act upon this liberal standard for reasonable
suspicion; data compiled by the New York City Police Department indicate that more
than one-third of all pedestrian detentions initiated by officers between January 1998
and March 1999 were premised on suspicion of a weapons crime. See SPITZER REPORT,
supra note 40, at 118 tbl.I.B.3, 128 n.39.
4 See SPITZER REPORT, supra note 40, at 117 n.23 (discussing the paucity of stops
prompted by a suspected weapons offense that led to arrests for a weapons crime);
Rosenthal, supra note 42, at 40-41 (relating that New York Police Department "data
shows that the error rate for weapons searches was higher than for other types of
searches.... [T]here is little doubt that evaluating suspicious bulges and the like
involve a substantial risk of error. . . .").
4 Though feedback loops optimally would exist such that these discrepancies
would be accounted for in assessments of reasonable suspicion, the fact-specific
nature of the reasonable-suspicion inquiry precludes ready resort to statistics or
presumptions based solely on the type of crime involved. Cf Max Minzner, Putting
Probability Back into Probable Cause, 87 TEx. L. REV. 913 (2009) (arguing that judicial
determinations of probable cause should take into consideration the officer-
applicant's "success rates" in finding evidence when executing prior warrants).
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For the most part,4 5 this Article is concerned with another type of
crime, one that produces similar results (many detentions, but usually no
further proceedings) but for different reasons. In the usual case, a
detention on reasonable suspicion (or arrest on probable cause) is made
with the ultimate goal of convicting the offender of the crime for which
reasonable suspicion (or probable cause) exists. With detention crimes,
whether the detained person is ultimately charged with and convicted of
the offense that led to the detention is beside the point; the prosecution
of these crimes is typically not worth the effort. The utility of these crimes
lies instead in the authority to temporarily detain that the offenses confer
upon law enforcement.
From the perspective of law enforcement, a detention, by itself, can
serve several useful purposes. The harms that some crimes seek to
prevent can be addressed by giving police officers temporary custody of
and control over the person committing the proscribed act. Likewise,
detention or arrest alone can fulfill the intended deterrence, retribution,
incapacitation, and punishment functions of particular criminal
sanctions, with much less time and expense than full prosecution would
require. Finally, detention crimes often facilitate the investigation of
other offenses by providing law enforcement with justifications for
nonconsensual contacts with criminal suspects.
As to the first of these uses, some crimes implicate conduct as to
which there typically exists an important interest in temporarily
controlling the offender's movements for reasons other than the further
investigation of a crime. Public intoxication laws, for example, commonly
apply to persons who are unable to exercise due care for their safety, or
for the safety of others.4 ' These crimes provide a basis upon which to
detain intoxicated persons-in some cases, literally picking them up from
the middle of the street-and glace them in safer environments where
they can return to sobriety. Though these individuals could be
" At some point, the disconnect between the circumstances recognized as
amounting to reasonable suspicion of a crime, and likelihood that an investigation
that builds on this suspicion will ultimately produce evidence of that crime, may
become so great that any reasonable officer would appreciate that a stop has no
appreciable chance of yielding evidence of that offense. These circumstances could
produce a detention crime under the definition used in this Article.
" As used here, "crime" encompasses even non-jailable infractions, provided that
they provide adequate and appropriate grounds for a vehicle stop, or a similar
detention,
" See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(f) (West 2010) (providing that one is guilty of
public intoxication when found in a public place, under the influence of an
intoxicant, and either "in a condition that he or she is unable to exercise care for his
or her own safety or the safety of others," or "interfer[ing] with or obstruct[ing] or
prevent[ing] the free use of any street, sidewalk, or other public way").
4 E.g., In re Bolt, No. V2004-61268, 2005 WL 1526153, at *1 (Ohio Ct. Cl. May 20,
2005) (relating an incident in which a local fire department removed an alcoholic
from the middle of the street). See also Axel Kleiboemer & Frank L. Schneider, The
Law on Skid Row, 38 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 22, 38, 41 (1961) (remarking upon the "almost
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prosecuted for their inebriation, in many jurisdictions these charges are
forthcoming only in extreme cases,4 9 since the costs associated with
further prosecution commonly outweigh the perceived benefits.o
Detention offenses also can undergird less compassionate restraints.
Broad vagrancy and loitering laws, for example, were once used to harass
"undesirable" members of a community, often with the eventual goal of
driving these unfortunates out of town." Somewhere between these
universal attitude of benevolent paternalism which police officers display toward
alcoholic derelicts" and observing that "on Skid Row the reason for the arrest of a
chronic alcoholic is, almost invariably, a desire to prevent him from injuring himself
and to protect him from jackrollers . . ."); Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its
Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 631-32 (1956) (commenting on the
Philadelphia police's practice of conducting "protective arrests" of persons who do
not "belong" in a dangerous area, with the applicable vagrancy law providing the
grounds for the arrest).
" SeeJerome Hall, The Law of Arrest in Relation to Contemporary Social Problems, 3 U.
CH. L. REv. 345, 360-61 (1936). One study of San Francisco courts in the early 1920s
found that more than 99% of public intoxication cases were dismissed in the police
court, with no complaint being filed in the vast majority of these matters. Henrietta
Heinzen & Rhoda K. Rypins, Crime in San Francisco: A Study of the Police Court Docket, 18
J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLoGY 75, 83-84 (1928).
50 See Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, supra note 10, at 13
("Criminal procedure's costs come paired with benefits-special restrictions are
attached to special powers-and the costs themselves can be vastly reduced in a world
that allows police and prosecutors discretion not to arrest and not to charge.").
5 Id. at 18; Foote, supra note 48, at 614 ("Perhaps [a vagrancy crime's] principal
employment is as a clean-up measure in dealing with the problems of congested
urban 'skid row' districts. Unwanted drunkards, panhandlers, gamblers, peddlers or
paupers are committed or banished, a procedure that is alleged to deter other like
persons from entering or remaining in a given locality."), 631 ("Prosecutions [for
vagrancy] were carried on in a bewildering variety of other situations which had no
relation to the suppression of criminality."); Forrest W. Lacey, Vagrancy and Other
Cimes of Personal Condition, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1203, 1218 (1953) ("One aspect of the
crime-preventive use of vagrancy statutes is simply to harass reputed criminals and
drive them out of town."); Note, Use of Vagrancy-Type Laws for Arrest and Detention of
Suspicious Persons, 59 YALE L.J. 1351, 1352 n.5 (1950) [hereinafter Use of Vagrancy-Type
Laws] ("Frequently, the police follow the custom of repeatedly jailing on vagrancy
charges known or suspected criminals against whom no serious crime can be proven
in order to keep them out of circulation and persuade them to leave town."); Carl V.
Eimbeck, Some Recent Methods of Harassing the Habitual Criminal, 16 ST. Louis L. REV.
148, 151-58 (1931). Among their uses, vagrancy laws were invoked to "support arrests
for activities which the police desire to suppress, such as 'communistic agitation,' or
labor organization" in the first half of the twentieth century. Foote, supra note 48, at
629 (footnote omitted). In one instance, "[t]he San Francisco police once arrested
375 men at one time, mostly in union halls, and charged them with vagrancy." Id. In
another, a state vagrancy law was used to break up, and then arrest many participants
in, a so-called "homosexual convention" that took place in Texas in 1953. Waco Cops
Arrest 63 Men in Raid on Sex Convention, MEXIA DAILY NEWS (Mexia, Tex.), April 13,
1953, at 1.
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extremes lie juvenile curfew and daytime loitering laws," violations of
which are rarely prosecuted in large communities.
Law enforcement also may consider the shame and inconvenience
that may be associated with a detention or arrest as satisfactory
punishment for certain crimes, and thus lack interest in further
prosecution. An arrest is a "public act that may seriously interfere with
the defendant's liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and that may
disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his
associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his
family and his friends."5 4 The shaming effect of an arrest carries special
weight when "morals" crimes are involved." The obloquy associated with
a public arrest for, say, soliciting a prostitute may, on its own, almost
entirely effectuate the aims of the underlying criminal prohibition. In
this spirit, a survey of the San Francisco police court docket conducted
almost a century ago reveals that out of 225 persons arrested for visiting a
"disorderly house" (typically a gambling den or a brothel) over the
studied period, 221 were discharged without a trial.57
The third, and most significant, application of detention crimes
involves their use in the investigation of other offenses. Reasonable
suspicion of a crime-any crime 5 5-will justify a detention that is, in fact,
5' See generally Note, Juvenile Curfews and the Major Confusion over Minor Rights, 118
HARv. L. REv. 2400 (2005) (discussing these laws).
" Leslie Joan Harris, An Empirical Study of Parental Responsibility Laws: Sending
Messages, but What Kind and To Whom?, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 5, 25-27 (2006) (reporting
that several large jurisdictions do not prosecute violations of juvenile curfew laws,
with some of these localities maintaining a policy of returning first offenders to their
parents).
" United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971). See also HUSAK, supra note
20, at 13 ("the experience of arrest is embarrassing, costly and inconvenient"); Reza,
supra note 40, at 771 (relating that an arrest is "a truth that [the arrestee] will almost
always find embarrassing and unflattering, to say the least .... Personal ties can be
strained, family members shunned, current employment lost and future job prospects
threatened, social status damaged-and worse."); Kirk R. Williams & Richard
Hawkins, The Meaning of Arrest for Wife Assault, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 163, 170-75 (1989)
(discussing the various implications of arrest for spousal abuse); Richard A.
Williamson, The Dimensions of Seizure: The Concepts of "Stop" and "Arrest," 43 OHIO ST.
L.J. 771, 774 (1982) (relating some of the consequences of an arrest).
5 SeeJames Q. Whitman, What is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE
L.J. 1055, 1064-66 (1998).
5 See Courtney Guyton Persons, Sex in the Sunlight: The Effectiveness, Efficiency,
Constitutionality, and Advisability of Publishing Names and Pictures of Prostitutes'Patrons, 49
VAND. L. REV. 1525 (1996) (discussing the public "shaming" of persons arrested for
soliciting prostitutes).
5 Heinzen & Rypins, supra note 49, at 84.
" Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-13 (1996); see also Stuntz, Substance,
Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, supra note 10, at 12-13 (observing that "the
probable cause and reasonable suspicion standards treat all crimes alike," and "[flor
almost all purposes in the law of criminal procedure, one crime is just as good as
another. This is hardly a surprise; procedural rules are almost always
transsubstantive.").
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subjectively prompted by constitutionally deficient suspicion relating to
some other offense. 9 This "objective" standard for determining the
propriety of a detention means that police officers may stop and detain
someone for a crime they do not care to pursue to the point of arrest,
charging, or conviction.6 Detention crimes thus provide handy tools to
officers interested in probing hunches regarding possible criminal
conduct as to which "direct" reasonable suspicion is lacking.6' Although
any detention must be reasonably tailored to the crime for which
reasonable suspicion exists," these investigations will often turn up
evidence relating to the offense that in fact motivated the officer to take
action.
Detention offenses have long represented an important species of
criminal law. For many years, police leveraged broadly written"
" In evaluating the lawfulness of a detention ab initio, the law does not inquire
into whether reasonable suspicion existed to detain a suspect for the crime(s) that
subjectively motivated the officer to act. Instead, a detention is valid if the officer is
aware of facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion (or, in the case of arrests, probable
cause) that a crime had been, was being, or was about to be committed. Whren, 517
U.S. at 813 (affirming that an officer's subjective intentions "play no role in ordinary,
probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis").
60 See Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, supra note 10, at 10
("Procedural rules make broader criminal liability more attractive, since the latter can
be used as a device for evading the costs of the former. The government can exploit a
jaywalking ban without enforcing it, by using the jaywalking ban as a tool for
enforcing other prohibitions without actually punishing jaywalking.") (emphasis
omitted).
63 See Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, supra note 10, at 539
("[C]rimes that cover low-level street behavior ... will only rarely be prosecuted, but
... often serve as a convenient basis for an arrest and, perhaps, a search."); Foote,
supra note 48, at 628-29 (observing that a vagrancy charge "may be a mere cloak for
an arrest that officers have been ordered to make, an arrest for some other offense, as
a means of validating what would otherwise be an illegal search"). Suggestive of such
use, these offenses were once sometimes referred to as "dragnet" crimes. E.g., People
v. Tylkoff, 105 N.E. 835, 836 (N.Y. 1914).
6 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (observing that the reasonableness, and
thus the constitutionality of an investigatory detention will depend on, inter alia,
"whether [the detention] was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place"). Some allowance is made for questioning
relating to other matters, provided that the inquiries do not appreciably extend the
duration of the stop. See Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781, 788 (2009) (discussing
this principle in connection with a vehicle stop).
65 See Gary V. Dubin & Richard H. Robinson, The Vagrancy Concept Reconsidered:
Problems and Abuses of Status Criminality, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 102, 130 (1962) ("[T]he
vague definitions of vagrancy confer on an officer discretion so broad that technically
he can seldom be held not to have had probable cause for the arrest."); Use of
Vagrancy-Type Laws, supra note 51, at 1351-53 (asserting that vagrancy and "suspicious
persons" statutes are often "so broadly phrased as to permit the police and trier of
fact to determine the question of guilt according to their own moral and political
standards").
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loitering, vagrancy, disorderly conduct,66 and public intoxication6
crimes-collectively, the so-called "garbage pail of the criminal law" -to
investigate other offenses,69 to "clean up the streets," and to facilitate law
enforcement ob*ectives distinct from the goal of generating convictions
for these crimes.
6 Dubin & Robinson, supra note 63, at 109 (discussing loitering offenses,
described as a subset of vagrancy crimes).
Id. at 109-11 (discussing various types of vagrancy offenses).
* Hall, supra note 49, at 359.
Dubin & Robinson, supra note 63, at 110 (discussing this type of crime,
described as a subset of vagrancy). See generally William C. Carriger, Comment, The
Law of Public Drunkenness, 34 TENN. L. REv. 490 (1967) (discussing the variety and
breadth of public intoxication crimes).
6 Foote, supra note 48, at 631. This description was applied to "vagrancy-type"
laws, but in the pertinent era, this area of the law was sufficiently amorphous as to
encompass crimes that might today be regarded as falling within a separate
classification.
6 Lacey, supra note 51, at 1218 ("An individual suspected of another crime may
be arrested on a charge of vagrancy so that the police will have the opportunity of
investigating further or of securing a voluntary or coerced confession."); Stuntz, The
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, supra note 10, at 539; Use of Vagrancy-Type Laws,
supra note 51, at 1358 ("Brief arrests under these vague [curfew, vagrancy, and
suspicious persons] statutes are often for the purpose of investigations which could
otherwise be accomplished only by illegal detention.").
70 See William 0. Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE L.J. 1, 12
(1960); Dubin & Robinson, supra note 63, at 130 ("[T]he vague definitions of
vagrancy confer on an officer discretion so broad that technically he can seldom be
held not to have had probable cause for the arrest."); Raymond Nimmer, Arrests for
Public Drunkenness: A Seldom Discussed Reform Strategy, 54 JUDIcATURE 335, 339 (1971);
Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, supra note 10, at 18 ("States and
localities for years had on their statute books vagrancy and loitering laws that could
easily be stretched to apply to almost anything one did in public. These laws were
widely (and openly) used as discretionary tools for the police to clean undesirables
off the streets."). Furthermore, some jurisdictions adopted "suspicious persons" laws
that only very loosely tethered a police officer's authority to arrest on the possible
commission of a crime. One Massachusetts statute, for example, provided that when a
police officer encountered someone at night and had "reason to suspect" that person
of an "unlawful design," the officer could "demand of them their business abroad and
whither they are going." If the person did "not give a satisfactory account of
themselves," the officer could arrest them. MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 41, § 98 (1921).
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The plethora of detentions and arrests for these crimes71 was not
followed by a similarly high volume of prosecutions and convictions.
72While some communities vigorously prosecuted these offenses, others
did not.7 3 To many law enforcement officers, these crimes fulfilled their
7 Arrest data compiled from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform
Crime Reports reflect the frequent utilization of these crimes during the mid-1900s:
Reported Arrests: Selected Crimes
Total Reported Disorderly Curfew/LoiteringYear Drunkenness Vagrancy Lw
Arrests Conduct Laws
1943 490,764 35,319 111,031 35,013
1953 1,791,160 199,548 774,096 75,754 Not Reported
1963 4,437,786 491,043 1,514,680 141,868
1973 9,027,700 720,400 1,599,000 62,300 151,200
1983 11,700,500 757,400 1,115,200 33,700 75,000
1993 14,036,300 727,000 726,600 28,200 100,200
2003 13,639,479 639,371 548,616 28,948 136,461
This dataset is derived from the following Uniform Crime Reports, issued annually by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department ofJustice: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS
2003, at 270 (2004); UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1993, at 217 (1994); UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTs 1983, at 170 (1984); UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1973, at 121 (1974); UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS 1963, at 104-05 (1964); UNIFORM CRIME REPORTs 1953, at 110 (1954);
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1943, at 87 (1944).
Other datapoints yield similar results. It was estimated that in 1966, one-third of
all arrests nationwide were for public intoxication. John M. Murtagh, Arrests for Public
Intoxication, 35 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 1 (1967). One study of arrests made in Detroit
between 1913 and 1919 found that disorderly conduct represented by far the most
common reason for arrests within the city during that time period, undergirding
approximately 38% of all arrests of men in the city in that span. Arthur Evans Wood,
A Study of Arrests in Detroit, 1913 to 1919, 21 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 168,
169 (1930). See also Foote, supra note 48, at 613 ("More persons are arrested for
vagrancy proper than for any of the more serious offenses except possibly larceny and
assault, and it is quite likely that more persons are convicted for this offense than for
any other.") (footnote omitted); C. Raymond Judice, Public Intoxication, 30 TEX. B.J.
341, 341 (1967) ("Of the 61,985 arrests made by the Houston Police Department in
1966, 26,453 were for public intoxication."); Police Business, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1882,
at 1 (reporting that of the 1,313 arrests made in Los Angeles in the fiscal year ending
October 31, 1882, 541 were for vagrancy, drunkenness, disorderly conduct, drunk
and disorderly conduct, disturbing the peace, or being "sick on the streets"); Work of
the City Police, CHESTER TIMES (Chester, Pa.), Jan. 11, 1916, at 1 (reporting that of
1,520 arrests made by the Chester police force in 1915, 1,186 were for vagrancy,
suspicion, disorderly conduct, drunk and disorderly conduct, or drunkenness).
7 For example, one source relates that in Tuscon, Arizona, between 1956 and
1959, 3,975 arrests for vagrancy led to 3,697 convictions for this offense. Douglas,
supra note 70, at 3-4. See also Foote, supra note 48, at 604-09, 643-47 (discussing the
prosecution of vagrancy cases).
7 Cf Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of
Criminal Law, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 910-11 (2001); Hall, supra note 49, at
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principal purpose at the point of detention or arrest; it was unnecessary,
74
even wasteful, to initiate further proceedings. Illustrating the point, a
study of Boston police practices between 1928 and 1933 found that all of
the 476 persons arrested for disorderly conduct in the city during that75
span were discharged without a court appearance.
These "garbage pail" crimes are no longer quite as important as they
once were. There are many reasons for the less-frequent utilization of
these crimes. First, some statutes codifying these offenses have been77found unconstitutional by courts. Some of the most expansive vagrancy
and loitering laws succumbed to courtroom assaults as early as the late
1800s." Beginning in the 1960s, federal and state courts began to
scrutinize these laws more carefully," striking down several measures as
359-61; Lacey, supra note 51, at 1224 (observing that "[m]any arrests are made [for
vagrancy] with no intention of bringing the cases to trial"). See also Report of the Chief of
Police, THE NORFOLK NEws (Norfolk, Neb.), May 8, 1903, at 11 (reporting on arrests
made by police in Norfolk, Nebraska during the period between May 1, 1902 and May
4, 1903; over that period, there were 32 arrests for vagrancy, two for disorderly
conduct, ten for drunkenness, six for disturbing the peace, with 120 "[t]ramps locked
up over night and sent out of city, not docketed").
" According to one observer in the early 1900s, "the unwillingness of many
police officials or magistrates to prosecute tramps is well known. When the vagrant is
told to 'get out of town or be run in' he of course decamps, and the town finances are
spared, while the neighboring community receives the shifted burden. Yet if the
convicted vagrant is sent to jail he becomes a source of contamination to other
inmates." Problem of the American Tramp, BEAVER HERALD (Beaver, Okla.) Sept. 10,
1908, at 2.
' Hall, supra note 49, at 359.
" Loitering crimes represent a notable exception; some localities have adopted
short-term detentions for these crimes as an anti-gang strategy. See Lawrence
Rosenthal, Gang Loitering and Race, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 99, 147 (2000)
(discussing the practice of repeatedly arresting gang members for loitering, as a way
to keep them off the streets). Cf Graham Rayman, The NYPD Tapes, Part 2: Bed-Stuy
Street Cops Ordered: Turn this Place into a Ghost Town, VILLAGE VOICE, May 11, 2010,
http://www.villagevoice.com/content/printVersion/1808402/ (discussing a New
York City Police Department practice of arresting persons for disorderly conduct in
order to "clear" the streets, but then releasing these individuals after a few hours in
custody, with no charges being filed).
7 See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 (1983); Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972) (finding vagrancy statutes unconstitutional).
See generally Timothy C. Gerking, Comment, Alternatives to Vagrancy Laws for Arizona,
1973 LAw & Soc. ORD. 881, 883 & n.16 (1974) (discussing and listing vagrancy statutes
that were found unconstitutional).
7 See Ex parte Smith, 36 S.W. 628, 629-30 (Mo. 1896) (striking down a Missouri
vagrancy ordinance); Ex parte Mittelstaedt, 297 S.W.2d 153, 153-54 (Tex. Crim. App.
1956) (striking down an ordinance making it unlawful to loaf or loiter within 250 feet
of any school or other public building); Ex parte Hudgins, 103 S.E. 327, 328-30 (W.
Va. 1920) (striking down a West Virginia law that criminalized, as vagrancy, the
failure of an able-bodied man of working years to engage in regular, lawful
employment).
7 See Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, supra note 10, at 18
(discussing the judicial abrogation of vagrancy and loitering laws).
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void for vagueness" or, in a few instances, because they were found to
impose cruel and unusual punishment."' To the extent that jurisdictions
have replaced these crimes with narrower prohibitions, the lessened
breadth of these new statutes has made them less helpful in generating
sweeping grounds for detention.
Other changes in the law also have diminished the utility of these
crimes. In Terry v. Ohio,2 decided in 1968, the United States Supreme
Court affirmed that officers could detain suspects on reasonable
suspicion, a quantum of evidence less than probable cause.8 Prior to
Terry, the law was not entirely clear as to whether even a short-term
detention could be justified on anything less than a probable cause
standard.8 This uncertainty made the near-ubiquitous probable cause
afforded by vagrancy and loitering statutes important to everyday
investigatory efforts. In expanding the factual penumbras around other
offenses that provide lawful grounds for detention on suspicion, the
decision in Terry decreased law enforcement's need to invoke vagrancy
and other "dragnet" crimes.
Finally, new grounds for detentions have emerged. Modem traffic
laws and vehicle-equipment requirements, in particular, provide a
smorgasbord of options for police officers intent on stopping an
" See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 63 (1999) (finding a Chicago anti-
loitering ordinance unconstitutionally vague); Kolender, 461 U.S. at 359-61 (rejecting
a California law that required loiterers to present "credible and reliable"
identification to law enforcement officers upon demand); Papachristou, 405 U.S. at
162 (finding a Jacksonville vagrancy ordinance void for vagueness); In re Newbern,
350 P.2d 116, 123-24 (Cal. 1960) (rejecting, on vagueness grounds, "common
drunkard" language within California's vagrancy statute).
8 E.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (finding
unconstitutional a state law that made it a misdemeanor to "be addicted to the use of
narcotics," on the ground that application of the statute inflicted cruel and unusual
punishment barred by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
1 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
8 Id. at 30-31.
See Foote, supra note 48, at 614 ("Administratively, vagrancy-type statutes are
regarded as essential criminal preventives, providing a residual police power to
facilitate the arrest, investigation and incarceration of suspicious persons."); Sam B.
Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 315, 317-20 (1942); Comment, Police
Power to Stop, Frisk, and Question Suspicious Persons, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 848, 853-56
(1965) (remarking upon the then-existing split of authority about whether an officer
could detain a suspect on less than probable cause).
8 Lacey, supra note 51, at 1218; Use of Vagrancy-Type Laws, supra note 51, at 1358.
6 In a similar vein, judicial elaboration of the community caretaking exception
to the warrant requirement has established the lawfulness of detentions made for
purposes other than criminal investigation. Under this exception to the warrant
requirement, officers may initiate a detention when they possess, "specific ...
articulable facts to suspect that a citizen is in need of help or is in peril." State v.
Marx, 215 P.3d 601, 605 (Kan. 2009). See also People v. Madrid, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 900,
906 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008); Mary Elisabeth Naumann, The Community Caretaker Doctrine:
Yet Another Fourth Amendment Exception, 26 AM.J. CluM. L. 325 (1999).
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automobile. The California Department of Motor Vehicles, for instance,
identifies more than 750 distinct "rules of the road" and equipment
violations. These infractions and misdemeanors represent a mere subset
of the offenses proscribed by the state Vehicle Code that will provide
adequate grounds for a traffic stop." In California, an officer may stop a
vehicle upon reasonable suspicion of seat belt,90 signaling,9 1 stopping,9 2
passing, turning,9 right-of-way, and lane violations;" for driving too
fast9 or too slow;9 for following another vehicle too closely;" for a
severely cracked windshield or obstructions inside or outside of the
87 See Luna, supra note 10, at 726 ("[T]he all-encompassing nature of today's
codes appears little different from a single statute declaring that law enforcement
may pull over any car or stop any pedestrian at any time for any reason or, for that
matter, no reason at all."). A significant percentage of nonconsensual contacts with
the police involve vehicle stops. BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE,
CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 2005, at 1 (2007), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty-pbdetail&iid=432 [hereinafter CONTACTS
BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC] (relating that traffic stops accounted for 44% of all
face-to-face contacts between the police officers and members of the public in 2005).
When asked to give the reasons for these stops, officers attributed 53.3% of the stops
to speeding, 10.7% to record checks, and 9.6% to equipment defects. Id. at 4.
" Vehicle Code Appendix B List of Violations Division 11 Rules of the Road, CAL. DEP'T
OF MOTOR VEH., http://www.dmv.ca.gov/pubs/vctop/lov/lovd11.htm; Vehicle Code
Appendix B List of Violations Division 12 Equipment of Vehicles, CAL. DEP'T OF MOTOR VEH.,
http://www.dmv.ca.gov/pubs/vctop/lov/lovdl2.htm.
8 The California DMV also relates 65 other distinct offenses within the
Administration division of the Code, Vehicle Code Appendix B List of Violations Division 2
Administration, CAL. DEP'T OF MOTOR VEH., http://www.dmv.ca.gov/pubs/vctop/lov/
lovd2.htm; 85 offenses within the Registration division of the Code, Vehicle Code
Appendix B List of Violations Division 3 Registration of Vehicles, CAL. DEP'T OF MOTOR VEH.,
http://www.dmv.ca.gov/pubs/vctop/lov/lovd3.htm; 26 "special antitheft laws,"
Vehicle Code Appendix B List of Violations Division 4 Special Antitheft Laws, CAL. DEP'T OF
MOTOR VEH., http://www.dmv.ca.gov/pubs/vctop/lov/lovd4.htm; 101 offenses
relating to driver's licenses and unlicensed driving, Vehicle Code Appendix B List of
Violations Division 6 Driver's Licenses, CAL. DEP'T OF MOTOR VEH.,
http://www.dmv.ca.gov/pubs/vctop/lov/lovd6.htm; 14 offenses relating to a lack of
insurance, Vehicle Code Appendix B List of Violations Division 7 Financial Responsibility
Laws, CAL. DEP'T OF MOTOR VEH., http://www.dmv.ca.gov/pubs/vctop/lov/
lovd7.htm; and 10 crimes relating to accidents and accident reports, Vehicle Code
Appendix B List of Violations Division 10 Accidents and Accident Reports, CAL. DEP'T OF
MOTORVEH., http://www.dmv.ca.gov/pubs/vctop/lov/lovd10.htm.
* CAL. VEH. CODE § 27315(d)-(e) (West 2000).
" Id. § 22107.
9 Id. §§ 22109, 22450.
" Id. §§ 21750-59.
* Id. §§ 22100-05, 22107-08.
Id. §§ 21800-10.
Id. §§ 21650, 21657-58, 21714.
1 Id. §§ 22348(a), 22349-50.
9 Id. § 22400(a).
* Id. § 21703.
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vehicle that might interfere with driver visibility;'00 for windows with too
much tint;o'0 for an obstructed license plate; 0 2 and for burned-out
headlights,'o tail lights, 0 4 brake lights,0 0 or license plate lights,0 6 just to
name a few of the permissible grounds for a temporary detention. Not all
of these offenses are detention crimes, as defined by this Article. Drivers
who exceed the speed limit or run red lights often receive tickets, and
deservedly so. 07 For purposes of conducting a traffic stop, however, the
Vehicle Code does not distinguish between these offenses and other,
more trivial violations of state law, as to which a warning may represent
the most common outcome if the officer's investigation yields proof of
no other crime.'08
IV. CHARGING CRIMES
The second category of facilitating crimes-charging crimes-are
offenses that prosecutors allege with the expectation that they will be
dismissed or reduced to lesser charges pursuant to plea agreements. "
Charging crimes are inextricably intertwined with a form of plea
negotiations known as charge bargaining. With a charge bargain, the
'" Id. §§ 26708, 26710.
.o. Id. § 26708.5.
1o2 Id. § 5201.
Id. § 24400.
1o4 Id. § 24600.
1os Id. § 24603(e)-(f).
1o' Id. § 24601.
107 See CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, supra note 87, at 5 tbl.7
(relating that in traffic stops initiated in 2005, 71.1% of drivers who were stopped for
speeding received tickets, while 57.9% of drivers stopped for a stop sign or red light
violation were ticketed).
100 See Philip B. Heymann, The New Policing, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 407, 415 (2000)
(observing that police may "'stop' cars on the ground that they are being operated in
any way, however minor, in violation of local ordinances or state laws"). It is
impossible to ascertain the precise percentage of vehicle stops that are conducted as
pretexts for the investigation of other crimes. While many individuals ultimately
receive citations for the offenses that provide the initial legal grounds for these
detentions, a decision to issue a citation may be motivated by reasons other than a
desire to secure a conviction for the offense. An officer may believe that a failure to
cite a suspect (charged with other crimes) with the detention offense will provide
fodder for a defense argument that the stop was unjustified under any rationale, so
that evidence discovered by the officer in the course of the stop should be
suppressed. Even if the officer's investigation does not yield evidence of other crimes,
an officer may consider it useful to cite the detention offense anyway. Doing so will
secure an opportunity to establish the validity of the stop promptly in court, so as to
discourage a possible civil lawsuit for an invalid stop at some distant point in the
future.
'10 Charging crimes do not necessarily reflect an improper practice of alleging
crimes that cannot be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. A crime's status as a
charging offense follows from its tactical use to elicit plea bargains, not from its
allegation upon insufficient grounds.
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defendant pleads guilty (or no contest) to only some of the charges
alleged against him or her, with the other charges being dismissed.
Alternatively or in addition, the initial charges are reduced to (or
replaced with) lesser crimes, to which the defendant enters a guilty or no
contest plea. 0 Charge bargaining has existed for almost as long as plea
bargaining itself... While not all states collect data regarding the
prevalence of charge bargaininF, what information exists suggests that it
is a fairly common practice," particularly in jurisdictions where the
agreed-upon crimes of conviction place significant constraints on judicial
discretion at sentencing.
Charging crimes are jettisoned or reduced in an inordinate number
of charge bargains. It may sound counterintuitive for a prosecutor to
charge a crime that he or she is perfectly willing (or even desires) to
plead down or dismiss. By alleging such an offense, however, a
prosecutor may encourage a defendant to plead guilty or no contest to a
different charge or charges, in exchange for the dismissal of the
originally alleged crime. This triangulated outcome may represent a
satisfactory (or even optimal) resolution to a case from the prosecutor's
perspective, particularly when the initial charged offense or combination
of offenses carries an arguably excessive punishment relative to the
no See Stephen S. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 231, 278-82 (1989)
(discussing "charge bargaining" by federal prosecutors).
.. See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING
IN AMERICA 21-24 (2003) (documenting the practice of charge bargaining in liquor
cases in 1800s Massachusetts); Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 17 (1979) (discussing early charge bargains). See also Mo. ASS'N FOR
CRIM. JUSTICE, THE MISSOURI CRIME SURVEY 315 (1926) (representing that more than
ten percent of all pleas within the sample of surveyed cases were to lesser offenses
than originally charged); LESTER BERNHARDT ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM
ARREST TO APPEAL 298-99 (1947) ("A practice has grown up that is so common that it
forms the chief technique employed; namely, waiver of the major felony charge and
acceptance of a plea of guilty of a lesser offense. ... In Chicago in 1926, 78.81% of all
pleas of guilty in felony cases were entered to minor offenses. Reduction was most
frequent in property crimes such as robbery, burglary, and larceny, and not so
frequent in cases of homicide, rape, and other sex crimes.") (footnotes omitted);
Raymond Moley, The VanishingJury, 2 S. CAL. L. REv. 97, 109-11 (1928) (commenting
upon the practice of pleading to a lesser offense than that originally charged,
describing this custom as "much more common" than "securing pleas of guilty by the
express or implied promise of leniency," and discussing data that indicate the
prevalence of the practice).
"1 For example, data on dispositions in the Tennessee state courts reveal that
approximately one-eighth of all reported guilty pleas are to lesser charges than
originally alleged. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE TENNESSEE JUDICIARY FISCAL YEAR 2007-
2008: STATISTICs 20 (2008). See also Mo. Ass'N FOR CRIM. JUSTICE, supra note 111, at
315; ORFIELD, supra note 111, at 298-99; Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea
Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and its
Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1284, 1287-88 (1997)
(discussing the frequent use of charge bargains in Minnesota).
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gravamen of the defendant's alleged misconduct." While the possibility
exists that the defendant will demand a trial on the charged crime (s),
frustrating any desire the prosecutor may have to see the defendant
ultimately convicted of a lesser offense or offenses, the prosecution may
take comfort in the fact that the less serious crimes still may be available
to the parties at trial, as lesser included offenses.' In any event, to a
prosecutor, the increased likelihood of a conviction for the charged
offense(s), and a resulting sentence that may be somewhat in excess of
what the prosecutor considers ideal, may represent a small price to pay
for the smaller chance of acquittal (after a trial, which a defendant
charged only with a less serious offense may be more eager to face) or
dismissal (after pretrial motion practice that might be avoided through
plea bargaining) than would be the case had the prosecutor charged only
the crime(s) to which a plea is sought.11
Commentators have posited that charging crimes exist, but the
available data remain somewhat inconclusive. It has long been
established that, in a given jurisdiction, prosecutors will dismiss or reduce
some crimes pursuant to charge bargains more often than others."'
"' Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV.
50, 86 (1968) (observing that in cases of "vertical overcharging," in which a
prosecutor charges a crime as an offense carrying greater punishment than the facts
would seem to merit, "[tihe allegedly extravagant charge usually encompasses, as a
'lesser included offense,' the crime for which the prosecutor actually seeks
conviction"). See also Norman Abrams, The New Ancillary Offenses, 1 CRIM. L. F. 1, 25
(1989) (discussing this mindset).
" Alschuler, supra note 113, at 86.
"' See HUSAK, supra note 20, at 38.
116 Alschuler, supra note 113, at 86; Abrams, supra note 113, at 24-25. In this
context, commentators often make reference to a "going rate" in plea deals. See, e.g.,
Malcolm M. Feeley, Pleading Guilty in Lower Courts, 13 IAw & Soc'Y. REV. 461, 463
(1979); Arthur Rosett, The Negotiated Guilty Plea, 374 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc.
Sci. 70, 71 (1967) ("In some places a 'going rate' is established, under which a given
chare will almost automatically be broken down to a given lesser offense. .
.
Other authors have documented recurring charge bargains in which a
particular crime is customarily reduced to another offense in a particular jurisdiction.
E.g., LYNN M. MATHER, PLEA BARGAINING OR TRIAL? 84 (1979) (relating that in Los
Angeles in the 1970s, "most [grand theft auto] cases were settled by a guilty plea or
[slow plea] conviction of the lesser felony offense of joy riding or receiving stolen
property"). Several of these studies date back to the Golden Age of empirical research
into the administration of the criminal law. Among them, an inquiry into plea
bargaining practices in Illinois during the 1920s observed that charge reduction was
most common with property crimes such as robbery, burglary, and larceny, John J.
Healy, The Prosecutor (in Chicago) in Felony Cases, in ILL. ASS'N FOR CRIM. JUSTICE, THE
ILLINOIS CRIME SURVEY, 312-14 (1929); an examination of practices in the
Connecticut courts during the same era revealed that murder charges were reduced
most often, CHARLES E. CLARK & HARRY SHULMAN, A STUDY OF LAw ADMINISTRATION IN
CONNECTicUT 188-89 (1937); a similar study of Prohibition-era prosecutions in the
federal district courts found that fully 91.9% of all convictions to liquor offenses upon
pleas of guilty or no contest in the Northern District of California were entered as
"guilty to part," meaning that one or more charged offenses were dismissed as part of
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These findings suggest, but do not conclusively establish, the existence of
charging crimes; it could be the case, for example, that some crimes are
simply more difficult to prove beyond a reasonable doubt than others
are, and thus are more likely to be compromised even when the
prosecutor doesn't initially intend to bargain.
To better ascertain the existence of charging crimes, at least in
federal practice, the author reviewed data collected by the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts concerning each criminal case
terminated in the U.S. district courts between October 1, 2002 (the first
day of Fiscal Year 2003) and September 30, 2007 (the last day of Fiscal
Year 2007)."9 This dataset consists of 435,004 unique records. 120 Each
record relates, as to a single defendant in a criminal case, the five "most
serious" charges (as determined by the base offense level associated with
a plea bargain, AM. IAW INST., A STUDY OF THE BUSINESS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS pt. 1,
at 53 (1934); and a survey of California state prosecutors indicated that charges
alleging violations of liquor or traffic laws, or the crimes of seduction or statutory
rape, were among the most commonly compromised, Miller, supra note 20, at 13-15
& n.41. A half-century later, a longitudinal review of criminal cases filed in New York
City found substantial deterioration of burglary, robbery, and narcotics charges, but
far fewer compromises in homicide cases. VERA INSTITUTE OFJUSTICE, supra note 40, at
10. Most recently, a thorough study of segments of the North Carolina criminal code
found that the most serious assault crimes, which boast several reasonable bargaining
options, were pled down to lesser offenses more often than were kidnapping charges,
which lack a similar range of comparably attractive alternatives. Ronald F. Wright &
Rodney L. Engen, Charge Movement and Theories of Prosecutors, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 9, 12-
17 (2007) [hereinafter Wright & Engen, Charge Movement] (relating the relevant data,
and observing that "[w]here the criminal code offers the attorneys a deeper set of
plausible charges as landing spots in the negotiations, more charge movement
happens").
u' Plea-bargaining practices also are shaped by a number of idiosyncratic factors,
including the customs of the local prosecutor's office, corresponding groups of
defense attorneys (such as a public defender's office), and courtroom "workgroups"
consisting of particular prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges. See Schulhofer &
Nagel, supra note 112, at 1294-98.
" The data are available through the FederalJustice Statistics Program's website.
Federal justice Statistics Program Resource Guide, NAT'L ARCHIVE OF CRIM. JUSTICE DATA,
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/NACJD/fjsp/. The relevant databases (Federal Justice
Statistics Program: Defendants in Federal Criminal Cases in District Court-
Terminated, 2003 [ICPSR 24153]; Federal Justice Statistics Program: Defendants in
Federal Criminal Cases in District Court-Terminated, 2004 [ICPSR 24170]; Federal
Justice Statistics Program: Defendants in Federal Criminal Cases in District Court-
Terminated, 2005 [ICPSR 241871; Federal Justice Statistics Program: Defendants in
Federal Criminal Cases in District Court-Terminated, 2006 [ICPSR 24205]; and
Federal Justice Statistics Program: Defendants in Federal Criminal Cases in District
Court-Terminated, 2007 [ICPSR 24222]) were downloaded in ASCII Tab-Delimited
file format, and then converted into Microsoft Excel files. The author then sorted the
records by manner of disposition, and removed all cases that were not resolved, in
whole or in part, through a plea of guilty or no contest. Copies of the downloaded
datasets and the datasets as modified are in the author's custody.
' Kyle Graham, Shortened Plea Bargain AOUSC Spreadsheets (2011)
(unpublished spreadsheet data analysis) (on file with author).
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the charge"'), the "most serious" offense of conviction, if any, and the
sentence ultimately imposed by the court.
The idiosyncrasies of the federal criminal laws, and the United States
Sentencing Guidelines applicable thereto, counsel caution when drawing
conclusions from this dataset. Even taken with a grain of salt, however,
the data reveal significant differences in how often specific federal crimes
disappear from cases pursuant to plea bargains. Over the studied time
period, 373,461 defendants had their cases resolved, at least in part,"
through a guilty or no-contest plea. In 82.3% of these dispositions
(totaling 307,518 defendants), the "most serious" offense at charging
remained the "most serious" offense at conviction.
Many crimes claimed a substantially higher "integrity rate" than
82.3%, while other offenses were compromised much more often. Within
the former class, hundreds of crimes never lost their status as the "most
serious" offense in any case that ultimately led to a plea of guilty or no
contest. 12 Most of these crimes were alleged in only a handful of cases.
But as Table I illustrates, some crimes that frequently represented the
"most serious" initial charge were never, or only rarely, discarded as part
of a plea agreement:
"' The "base offense level" represents the starting point for sentencing
calculations under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Higher base offense
levels translate into lengthier Guidelines-prescribed advisory terms. ROGER W. HAINES,
JR., FRANK 0. BOWMAN, III & JENNIFER C. WoL, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
HANDBOOK 1305 (2010).
122 The dataset contains certain inherent shortcomings that limit its usefulness.
Among them, by premising the "most serious" designation on the assigned base
offense level, the data may inadequately account for the fact that enhancements and
other penalty adjustments may apply to a different charge, such that the other charge
ultimately carries a greater penalty than the nominal "most serious" charging offense
does. Furthermore, the Guidelines were not mandatory for part of the studied time
period, such that a nominal "most serious" offense was not necessarily required to be
regarded as such by a sentencing judge. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245
(2005). Also, since the dataset includes only the five "most serious" charges and five
"most serious" terminating offenses, it does not fully capture the use of criminal laws
within the federal courts. For these and other reasons, this Article treats the data
principally as a useful starting point for analysis, as opposed to a definitive resource.
12 Graham, supra note 120. Some cases involved a guilty plea as to a charge or
charges, but a trial as to another charge or charges.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Among the crimes with a "perfect" record in this respect were violations of 18
U.S.C. § 656 (2006) (theft, embezzlement, or misapplication by bank officer or
employee) (which, when alleged as a misdemeanor, represented the most serious
terminating offense in all 212 plea-resolved cases where it was originally the most
serious charging offense) and 18 U.S.C. § 3615 (criminal default) (which, when
alleged as a misdemeanor, went 180 for 180 in this respect). Graham, supra note 120.
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Table I
Substitution of "Most Serious" Charges Pursuant to Plea: High Integrity Rates
Cases Where Most Cases Also MostUnited States
Code Section Description of Offense Serious Charging Serious Conviction Integrity RateOffense Offense
Willful failure to26 U.S.C.§2 U.S.C file a tax return 269 269 100%
(misdemeanor)
18 U.S.C. Fraud with identification
§ 1028(a)'2 ' documents (misdemeanor) 2,302 2,289 99.4%
8 U.S.C. Re-entry of an
§ 1326'" excluded alien'"
18 U.S.C.
3 , Bank robbery/burglary 5,397 5,212 96.6%§2113(a)'3
18 U.S.C. Unlawful transport 21,560 20,157
§ 922(g)'32  of firearms
1 Under this section of the Internal Revenue Code, "[a]ny person required ...
to pay any estimated tax or tax, or required by this title or by regulations made under
authority thereof to make a return, keep any records, or supply any information, who
willfully fails to pay such estimated tax or tax, make such return, keep such records,
or supply such information, at the time or times required by law or regulations, shall,
in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor." 26 U.S.C.
§ 7203 (2006).
" This provision proscribes a range of crimes relating to the production or
possession of false "identification documents," such as social security cards. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028. Both 26 U.S.C. § 7203 and 18 U.S.C. § 1028 displayed much higher integrity
rates when alleged as misdemeanors than when they were charged as felonies.
.. This section provides, in pertinent part, that anyone who "has been denied
admission, excluded, deported, or removed or has departed the United States while
an order of exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding, and thereafter . . .
enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United States" has committed
a felony, unless an exception applies. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2006).
'3 The AOUSC dataset identifies three separate § 1326 offenses: 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1326, 1326(a), and 1326(b). The figures above combine these offenses, which are
substantially similar in their integrity rates.
'3' Section 2113, subdivision (a) of Title 18 relates two somewhat distinct crimes.
The first is essentially bank robbery, as that crime is generally understood; this crime
applies to one who "by force and violence, or by intimidation," or by extortion, takes
or attempts to take property, money, or anything else of value from a bank or similar
financial institution. The second of these offenses amounts to bank burglary; it
creates the felony crime of entering or attempting to enter a bank or like
establishment with the intent to commit therein any felony affecting the institution,
or larceny. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).
132 Subdivision (g) of § 922 of Title 18 makes it a felony for a felon, or a person
belonging to any of several other identified classes (such as fugitives from justice and
citizens who have renounced their citizenship), to possess a firearm. 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g). The offenses described by 18 U.S.C. § 922 displayed wildly disparate
integrity rates. The integrity rate for 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) (interstate transportation,
shipment, or receipt of a firearm with a removed, altered or obliterated serial
number), for example, was just 43.7%. Graham, supra note 120.
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These crimes bear indicia of offenses that are unlikely to be
133 134
bargained down particularly often : they tend to be easy to prove,
their commission infrequently implicates other offenses (such that they
typically form the "core" of any case in which they appear),'13 and they
boast few attractive plea alternatives from the shared perspectives of
prosecutors and defense attorneys."" The infrequent dismissal of these
crimes therefore comes across as unsurprising.
At the other extreme, some crimes were pled down or dismissed
much more often when alleged as the most serious charging offense in a
case. Again, most of these crimes appeared in only a few cases, or in a
single matter. But this segment of commonly rejected offenses included a
number of crimes charged with some frequency, as set forth in Table 1113:
1 See Wright & Engen, Charge Movement, supra note 117, at 16-17 (discussing
some of the factors that affect how frequently a crime will be charge-bargained down
to a lesser offense).
' See EISENSTEIN &JACOB, supra note 14, at 235.
For instance, within the AOUSC dataset, all three of the identified 8 U.S.C.
1326 offenses (coded as 8 U.S.C. § 1326, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b))
represented the most serious charging offense in more than 90% of the cases in
which they appeared.
'" The most common alternative resolution to a case involving an initial "most
serious" charge under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 involved a plea to a charge under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1325, but this was the outcome in less than two percent of all cases in which a count
under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 represented the most serious charging offense.
' This table is not intended to be exhaustive. Another crime with a high
dismissal rate is 18 U.S.C. § 474 (possession of a counterfeiting plate, or a counterfeit
electronic image of a United States security), which was identified as the most serious
charging offense in 82 cases resolved by plea, but the most serious offense of
conviction in only 30 of these cases. The frequent dismissal of this crime likely owes
to its peripheral nature as compared to the crimes set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 471
(production of a counterfeit security) and 18 U.S.C. § 472 (uttering or passing a
counterfeit security), both of which were frequently charged alongside a § 474 count.
It also should be noted that while dismissals accounted for the vast majority of
instances in which crimes lost their status as the most serious charging offense in a
matter, in a few cases, these substitutions occurred for other reasons. Graham, supra
note 120.
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Table II
Substitution of "Most Serious" Charges Pursuant to Plea: Low Integrity Rates
Cases Where Most Cases Also Most
United States Name of Offense Serious Charging Serious Conviction Integrity Rate
Code Section Offense Offense
8 U.S.C. Aiding or assisting certain 42 7 16.7%( 1327"' aliens in entering the U.S.
18 U.S.C. Witness tampering 142 49 34.5%( 1512(a)"' through force/murder
18 U.S.C.
18 Uo203 Hostage taking 236 90 38.1%( 1203'
18 U.S.C. Use of fire/explosives in 262 105 40.1%
§ 844(h)"' commission of a felonV
21 U.S.C. Participation in a
§ 848(a), (b)1 2  continuing criminal 282 114 40.4%
enterpnse
18 U.S.C. Uttering a fictitious
§ 514" obligation, with intent to 180 77 42.8%
defraud
"Any person who knowingly aids or assists any alien inadmissible" due to a
conviction for an aggravated felony, or terrorist, or national security crime "to enter
the United States, or who connives or conspires with any person or persons to allow,
procure, or permit any such alien to enter the United States, shall be fined .. . or
imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both." 8 U.S.C. § 1327.
m' Section 1512(a) of Title 18 prohibits actual and attempted witness tampering
by means of force or threats of force. United States v. Lester, 749 F.2d 1288, 1293
(9th Cir. 1984).
4o "[W]hoever . .. seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure, or to continue
to detain another person in order to compel a third person or a governmental
organization to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition
for the release of the person detained, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be
punished. . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 1203(a).
"' Under 18 U.S.C. § 844(h), whoever "uses fire or an explosive to commit any
felony which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, or . . . carries an
explosive during the commission of any felony which may be prosecuted in a court of
the United States . . ." shall be sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. 18 U.S.C.
§ 844(h).
14' To prove a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848 (2006), the government must establish
that "(1) the defendant committed a felony violation of the federal narcotics laws, (2)
the violation was part of a continuing series of violations, (3) the series of offenses
occurred in concert with five or more persons, (4) the defendant was an organizer,
supervisor, or manager, and (5) the defendant obtained substantial income or
resources from the series of violations." United States v. Soto-Beniquez, 356 F.3d 1, 25
(1st Cir. 2003).
"' Section 514 of Title 18 of the United States Code prohibits the actual or
attempted passing, uttering, presenting, offering, brokering, or sale, of "any false or
fictitious instrument, document, or other item appearing, representing, purporting,
or contriving through scheme or artifice, to be an actual security or other financial
instrument issued under the authority of the United States, a foreign government, a
State or other political subdivision of the United States, or an organization . . ..
18 U.S.C. § 514(a).
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The fact that these crimes were dismissed quite often does not, by
itself, establish that they represent charging crimes. On the other hand,
certain characteristics of these crimes suggest a susceptibility to strategic
charging. These offenses tend to (1) carry stiff penalties, as compared to
related offenses;'" (2) have a close connection to another crime or
crimes;"' and (3) be in some sense peripheral to the "core" of a
defendant's misconduct. These qualities make these crimes particularly
suitable for charging with the understanding that their ultimate
disposition is open to negotiation, and that the prosecutor might be
satisfied with a plea to other offenses.147
14' For example, during the studied period the base offense level for a conviction
under 8 U.S.C. § 1327 was 23 or 25; cases in which this crime represented the most
serious charging offense most frequently (in 34 out of 42 plea-resolved cases) led to
plea bargains involving a lead charge under 8 U.S.C. § 1324, which carried a base
offense level of 12. UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.1 (2007);
UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.1 (2003); Graham, supra note
120.
14 For example, the crime related at 18 U.S.C. § 514 was intended to close a
small "loophole" in federal law relating to counterfeit securities lacking any "real"
analogue security actually issued by a government. Financial Instruments Anti-fraud Act:
Hearing on S. 1009 Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong.
1-3 (1996) (statement of Sen. Alfonse M. D'Amato, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs). See also United States v. Pullman, 187 F.3d 816,
822-23 (8th Cir. 1999) (discussing the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 514); United
States v. Summa, No. 02 CR. 101 (GEL), 2003 WL 21488093, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 25,
2003) (same). The frequent dismissal of this charge suggests that the loophole was
not quite as glaring as Congress thought it was.
46 Factors that may affect the frequency with which a crime will be pled down or
dismissed as part of a plea include, without limitation: (1) whether the offense is
relatively difficult to prove, or tends to create slam-dunk cases for prosecutors (if a
crime is easy to prove, little incentive normally exists for the prosecutor to enter into
a bargain that will lead to the reduction of the charge), see Wright & Engen, The
Effects of Depth and Distance, supra note 6, at 1967; (2) whether there exist other, closely
related offenses that will provide plausible alternatives for the parties to agree upon
as settlement options, id. at 1955; (3) whether the plausible alternative charges carry
slightly or moderately less punishment than the crime to be dismissed or reduced (as
opposed to significant differences in sentence length, stigma, or other aspects of
punishment, which make a reduction less likely), id. at 1940; Wright & Engen, Charge
Movement, supra note 117, at 16 ("Where the criminal code offers the attorneys a
deeper set of plausible charges as landing spots in the negotiations, more charge
movement happens."); Alschuler, supra note 113, at 104 ("[A]ccidents of 'spacing' in
the criminal code can greatly affect the pressures brought to bear on a defendant to
plead guilty."); and (4) whether the charged crime carries mandatory punishment
terms that are more severe than those desired by the prosecutor in the typical case
that implicates the offense.
"' Most of the crimes referenced in Table II represented the most serious
charging offense in the great majority of the cases in which they were alleged. A
charge under 8 U.S.C. § 1327 represented the most serious charging offense in all 42
of the cases terminating with a plea in which it appeared among the five most serious
charges (100%). The statistics for the other offenses, with the number of cases in
which the crime represented the most serious charging offense followed by the count
of cases terminating with a plea in which the crime appeared are as follows: 18 U.S.C.
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Of course, other reasons may lie behind the frequent rejection of
these charges. Some of these explanations may be almost as provocative
as the use of these crimes to induce pleas to other offenses. It may be the
case that these crimes are essentially cumulative of other federal offenses.
Alternatively or in addition, prosecutors might chronically misgauge the
difficulty of proving these offenses, such that indictments are readily
obtained but the charges must be jettisoned later. There also may be
other, more benign explanations for the frequent dismissal of these
charges. On the whole, however, it seems safe to say that even in the
rarified air of federal prosecutions, there likely exist at least a handful of
charging crimes.
V. PLEADING CRIMES
The third type of facilitating offense, "pleading crimes," consists of
criminal offenses that rarely (or never) provide the basis for an initial
arrest, and do not often represent the most serious charge when a
criminal case is filed (or even appear in the initial charging instrument).
Instead, these crimes rise to prominence in plea negotiations. In this
setting, these crimes frequently form the basis for plea agreements in
which other, more serious charges are dropped. 148
Pleading crimes might be understood as the flip side of charging
crimes; if a lead charge is pled down or dismissed, another crime must
take its place. Pleading crimes therefore tend to be positioned close
"below" other crimes within a criminal code, both in terms of their
gravamen and their sentencing consequences. Oftentimes a tight
relationship exists between specific charging crimes and pleading
offenses, but this is not always the case.
§ 1512(a) (142/151, or 94.0%); 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (236/252, or 93.7%); 18 U.S.C.
§ 844(h) (262/293, or 89.4%); 21 U.S.C. § 848 (282/329, or 85.7%); 18 U.S.C. § 514
(180/180, or 100%). By comparison, the firearm enhancement prescribed by 18
U.S.C. § 924(c), which had an integrity rate of 65.4% over the studied time period,
represented the most serious charging offense in only 58.6% of the cases in which it
appeared. Graham, supra note 120.
1 There is a close relationship between pleading crimes and so-called "backup"
offenses-relatively minor crimes that are alleged along with more serious charges as
"backups" in the event that the lead charges fail. See Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of
Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV.
747, 759 (2005) (discussing the use of the "backup" crime of fornication in rape
cases).
1 For example, William Stuntz has described the possible utility of retaining a
sodomy crime on the books, even if it is never charged: "First, when the government
initially charges some species of sexual assault, sodomy might serve as the basis for a
plea bargain, and its existence as a potential charge might give the government a
much greater chance of inducing a plea." Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-
Criminal Line, supra note 10, at 27.
'o Decades ago, pleas to joyriding (where the offense exists) commonly resulted
from the reduction of charges alleging grand theft auto. See Alschuler, supra note 113,
at 89 & n.92 (discussing the relationship between these offenses). Likewise, in 1920s
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Some pleading offenses are banal; others, very serious. At one
extreme, broken-speedometerm' and "coasting"2 charges provide
convenient grounds for plea agreements in speeding cases. These
offenses are extremely difficult to detect in the field, but the lesser
penalties that they carry (relative to speeding) , along with the frayed
but not completely fictional factual tethers that connect them with the
speedin offense, make them useful surrogates in excessive-speed
matters. One study of speeding cases in North Carolina found that
approximately 30% of all such matters statewide resulted in broken-
speedometer compromises;6 in two counties, these dispositions resolved
more than half of all speeding cases in which the driver was clocked at 90
miles per hour or faster. 5 7
New York, a defendant charged with pick-pocketing, a felony, often would have that
charge reduced to "jostling," an otherwise picayune misdemeanor, as part of a plea
bargain. Moley, supra note 111, at 109.
'' Other states (such as Georgia, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Virginia) also have
broken-speedometer laws similar to that in effect in North Carolina. Supra, note 1;
GA. CODE ANN. § 40-8-8 (2007); MisS. CODE ANN. § 63-7-75 (West 2009); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 46.2-1080 (2010).
112 "Coasting" occurs when a motorist sets his or her automobile's gears in
neutral while driving downhill. E.g., ALA. CODE § 32-5A-57 (LexisNexis 2010); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-895 (West 2004); CAL. VEH. CODE § 21710 (West 2000); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 42-4-1009 (2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 49-606 (2008); 625 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/11-1410 (West 2008).
.. Other states claim, or claimed, similar pleading crimes for use in traffic cases.
See Byrne, supra note 3, at 2968 (discussing "defective equipment" pleas in Missouri)
and 2989 (discussing "215" pleas in NewJersey and "cowl-lamp" pleas in Iowa).
" In North Carolina, conviction on a broken-speedometer charge leads to
penalties that are less severe than those attached to a speeding conviction. See
Editorial, supra note 1. In California, while a conviction for speeding will result in the
addition of "points" to one's driver's license, a coasting conviction does not have this
effect. See Vehicle Code Violations Used in Negligent Operator Counts, CAL. DEP'T OF MOTOR
VEH., http://www.dmv.ca.gov/dl/vioptct.htm.
15 One California attorney, "Stan The Radar Man," has posted on his website:
"Because the judges know truckers are cheated out of traffic school, many of them
are willing to give truckers a no point, non moving violation conviction called
coasting (21710 of the Vehicle Code). I use law defenses to win the case and I ask for
a coasting conviction as an alternative sentence. I do this to avoid any points against
your record." Stanley Alari, CDL TRUCKER TICKET LAWYER, http://www.trucker-ticket-
lawyer.com. See also Byrne, supra note 3, at 2968 (discussing the similar invocation of
defective-equipment charges by Missouri defense attorneys).
'5 Stith, Raynor & Locke, supra note 1. The vast number of broken-speedometer
pleas attracted the notice of the local media, see Editorial, supra note 1, leading to
modest legislative reform. Now, at least in theory, a broken-speedometer plea is
unavailable when the defendant is charged with speeding "in excess of 25 miles per
hour or more over the posted speed limit." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-141(o) (2009).
'5 Pat Stith, David Raynor & Mandy Locke, Cops Write Tickets, Speeders Get Deals,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 15, 2007, at Al. One recidivist scofflaw had his
speeding citations reduced to broken-speedometer charges in 17 out of 19 cases-
even though his speedometer was not, in fact, broken. Stith, Raynor & Locke, supra
note 1.
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Likewise, if voluntary manslaughter is not a pleading crime, it comes
very close to being one. It is well known that this crime is rarely charged
by prosecutors in the first instance, but often becomes a crime of
conviction through plea negotiations.' The federal sample of cases
resolved through pleas reveals, among the five "most serious" charges
filed in these cases during the surveyed time period, 425 murder charges,
246 involuntary manslaughter charges, and only 78 voluntary
manslaughter charges.'59 And whereas voluntary manslaughter
represented the most serious charging offense in only 25 cases, it was the
most serious terminating offense in 67 matters."'o Voluntary
manslaughter likely accounts for few charges, but many dispositions,
because of its relationship to the crimes of first- and second-degree
murder. A prosecutor might reason that (proof permitting) it is better to
allege these greater offenses in the first instance, a decision that will
permit a conviction to the charged crime but also accommodate a
voluntary manslaughter resolution to the case, if additional facts or
arguments make this charge reduction appropriate.
While voluntary manslaughter seems to be a "universal" pleading
crime, the connections that must exist between a pleading offense and
other portions of a criminal code mean that most of these crimes are
specific to a particular jurisdiction. Review of the federal dataset, for
instance, yields a few pleading crimes within the United States Code.
Misprision of a felony (18 U.S.C. § 4) was the most serious original
charging offense in only 602 cases disposed of by plea over the surveyed
time period. Yet this crime was the most serious terminating offense for
Alschuler, supra note 113, at 90.
'" Graham, supra note 120.
' Id.
... E.g., State v. Graham, 69 P.3d 563, 568 (Kan. 2003).
62 For example, in Texas a driving while intoxicated charge is sometimes pled
down to the lesser offense of "obstruction of a highway." See Karisa King, DWI Suspects
Have Way to Thwart Prosecutors, SAN ANrONIo EXPRESS-NEwS, April 6, 2008, at Al; Karisa
King & Elizabeth Allen, D.A. Seeks to Expedite DWIs, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEwS, April
1, 2008, at Al. Petty larceny also may represent a pleading crime at certain times and
places in which the offense is deemed too minor a basis to launch a prosecution, but
an adequate ground upon which to terminate one. And so, of 1,855 felony charges in
cases initiated in Chicago in 1926 that were reduced to a lesser offense, 973 were
ultimately resolved as petty larceny. Moley, supra note 111, at 118.
' "Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable
by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make
known the same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the
United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years,
or both." 18 U.S.C. § 4 (2006). The essential elements of misprision of a felony "are
1) the principal committed and completed the alleged felony; 2) defendant had full
knowledge of that fact; 3) defendant failed to notify the authorities; and 4) defendant
took steps to conceal the crime." United States v. Cefalu, 85 F.3d 964, 969 (2d Cir.
1996).
6972011]
HeinOnline  -- 15 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 697 2011
LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW
2,359 defendants who pled guilty or no contest over this span.'1 Likewise,
use of a communications facility in furtherance of the distribution of
narcotics, marijuana, or a controlled substance (21 U.S.C. § 843(b))1 15
was the most serious charging offense in just 552 cases resolved by plea,
but the most serious termination offense in 1,884 such matters.
Each of these crimes bears indicia suggestive of a pleading crime : a
plausible connection to another offense or offenses, lesser penalties than
that crime or crimes, 16 and significant reasons why it would not typically
represent the most serious original charge in a case. On this last point,
the crime of misprision of a felony is sufficiently banal as to call into
question the need for pervasive prosecution. As for the 21 U.S.C.
§ 843(b) offense, its commission usually implicates other, much more
substantial drug trafficking crimes, which normally will occupy the full
attention of the initial charging instrument. If and when significant
cracks appear in that case-whether due to witness availability or
'" This crime also had an extremely high integrity rate (99.5%) within the
dataset, suggesting that in many cases an agreement was reached early on with the
defense whereby the defendant agreed in advance to plead to the misprision offense,
instead of other possible charges. Graham, supra note 120.
15 "It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to use any
communication facility in committing or in causing or facilitating the commission of
any act or acts constituting a felony" under subchapters I and II of chapter 13 of Title
21 of the United States Code. 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (2006). The identified subchapters
encompass sections 801-971 of Title 21, which relate most of the significant federal
drug crimes.
'" Graham, supra note 120.
167 See Wright & Engen, Charge Movement, supra note 117, at 16-17 (discussing the
circumstances in which an offense is likely to be bargained down to a lesser charge,
including the characteristics of the ultimate charge of conviction).
1*6 The base offense level for misprision of a felony is set at nine levels below that
for the concealed or non-reported offense, but in no case less than four, or higher
than 19. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2X4.1 (2010). The maximum
sentence for a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) is four years. 21 U.S.C. § 843(d).
This 48-month maximum commonly results in sentences that are lower than the
Guidelines range for comparable drug-distribution crimes, particularly when large
quantities of drugs are involved. See, e.g., United States v. Thornton, 188 F. App'x 733,
737 (10th Cir. 2006) (discussing the application of the Guidelines to a conviction
under 21 U.S.C. § 843).
"9 Other federal crimes also represented the most serious offense of conviction
in far more cases than they represented the most serious charging offense, but have
not been identified here as pleading crimes. To understand why, assume that Crime
A and Crime B carry the same penalties, but that a coding decision has been made by
the creators of the AOUSC dataset, such that Crime A is consistently identified as the
more serious charging offense. If Crimes A and B are often alleged together in an
initial indictment (as, for example, drug crimes often are), in each case in which
Crime A is dismissed after being identified as the most serious charging offense,
Crime B will become the most serious offense of conviction (assuming no other
counts are involved). If Crime A is dismissed often enough, a significant imbalance
may result between how often Crime B is alleged as the most serious charging offense
and how often it represents the most serious terminating offense, even though Crime
B has played an important part in each case since the time of charging.
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credibility issues, a viable defense motion to dismiss or suppress, or
otherwise-the § 843(b) offense may provide a face-saving escape route
for the prosecutor.
All of the pleading crimes that have been discussed to this point are
susceptible to all phases of the procedural continuum; they just tend to
implicate the latter portions of this process. The wet reckless offense
recognized in California is a different animal, for it categorically cannot
form the basis for an arrest or an initial charge. It is, in short, a "pure"
pleading crime. The unique character of the wet reckless warrants close
review, as it suggests an altogether different, procedurally selective model
for criminal offenses.
As background, under California law a conviction for driving under
the influence of drugs or alcohol (DUI) carries a substantial fine and
serious consequences for one's driving privileges.no A DUI conviction will
also ratchet up the penalties attendant to a subsequent conviction for the
same offense."' In the 1970s, many DUI charges were plea-bargained
down to reckless driving,17 1 which involved (and still entails) a smaller
fine and less severe licensing consequences,7 and did not (and still does
not) count as a "prior" in the event of a later DUI prosecution.
Frustrated by these plea bargains, in 1981 the California legislature
17o See CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 23536, 23538 (West 2000) (prescribing the penalties
associated with a conviction for driving under the influence).
1' See id. § 23540 (relating the penalties for a conviction for driving under the
influence, with a prior conviction for driving under the influence or a "wet reckless");
id. at § 23546 (relating the penalties for a conviction for driving under the influence,
with two prior convictions for driving under the influence or "wet reckless" driving);
id. at § 23550 (relating the penalties for a conviction for driving under the influence,
with three prior convictions for driving under the influence or a "wet reckless"
driving).
112 See DEP'T OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG PROGRAMS, ENROLLED BILL REPORT, Assemb.
1981-82-348, at 1 (Cal. 1981) (discussing the "wholesale or indiscriminate practice of
reducing driving-under-the-influence offenses to reckless driving violations which
have negligible penalties"); GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON ALCOHOL, DRUGS & TRAFFIC
SAFETY, TASK FORCE REPORT: ALCOHOL, DRUGS AND TRAFFIC SAFETY, at IV-4 (1981)
("Reduction of a charge to reckless driving is one of the more frequent results of plea
bargaining. The ranges of the penalties for reckless driving (23103 V.C.), including
assessments, brings the penalty into the lower ranges of those for driving under the
influence. However, a conviction of reckless driving does not carry the potential for
license suspension or heavier sanctions for future offenses that a driving under the
influence conviction does, and is, therefore, a more desirable outcome for the
defendant."). The practice of pleading DUI charges down to reckless driving was not
unique to California. See Alschuler, supra note 113, at 94 (discussing similar plea
bargains in Illinois).
.7. Compare CAL. VEH. CODE § 23103(c) (relating the penalties for a "dry" reckless
conviction), with id. §§ 23536, 23538 (same, for a DUI conviction).
"' See id. § 23103.5.
1"5 See S. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, BACKGROUND INFORMATION, Assemb. 1981-82-348,
at 2 (Cal. 1981) ("The main purpose of the bill is to address abuses associated with
the current practices of reducing drunk driving charges to reckless driving through
plea bargainin[g]."). Another report on AB 348 observed that "[w]ith the current
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passed Assembly Bill (AB) 348, providing that in any DUI case pled down
to reckless driving, the prosecutor must relate on the record whether the
offense involved the consumption of drugs or alcohol.7  When the
prosecutor declares that drugs or alcohol were implicated, the defendant
will be subject to somewhat greater punishment than is otherwise
associated with a conviction for reckless driving, and the conviction will
count as a prior DUI conviction for purposes of assigning punishment for
future DUI convictions.1 77
The legislative history surrounding AB 348 yields no indication that
the California legislature believed that this measure somehow created a
novel crime, as opposed to a new plea procedure with customized
178 .. 179 180
consequences. Nevertheless, courts, practitioners, commentators,
and the California Department of Motor Vehicles"" all came to recognize
a conviction that results from a guilty or no-contest plea to reckless
driving, when pled down from a DUI charge and accompanied by a
declaration of drug or alcohol use in the commission of the offense, as
reflective of a new, distinct crime: a "wet reckless"18 2 (whereas a
plea bargaining policies, a large number of persons arrested for drunk driving are
allowed to plead guilty to reckless driving rather than go to trial. Then if there is a
subsequent conviction for drunk driving, the record does not show a previous DUI
conviction. Therefore, no mandatory jail time is imposed. This bill will close this
loophole and will remove that enticement to plead guilty to a lesser offense." CAL.
HIGHWAY PATROL, ENROLLED BILL REPORT, Assemb. 1981-82-348, at 2 (Cal. 1981).
17 CAL. VEH. CODE § 23103.5(a).
17 Id. at § 23103.5(c).
.. See, e.g., People v. Forrester, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 740, 742 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)
(referring to a "wet reckless" conviction); Walker v. Kiousis, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 69, 74
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (same); People v. Claire, 280 Cal. Rptr. 269, 271 & n.2 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991) (discussing the common use of the term "wet reckless" in describing a
plea under section 23103.5 of the California Vehicle Code).
1 See, e.g., Charge Reductions, S. CAL. DUI DEFENSE, http://www.southem-
california-dui-defense.com/charge reductions.html (describing the wet reckless
offense).
Iso E.g., LAWRENCE TAYLOR & ROBERT TAYAc, CALIFORNIA DRUNK DRIVING DEFENSE
§ 3.2 (4th ed. 2008).
"' See HELEN N. TASHIMA & SLADJANA OULAD DAOUD, CAL. DEP'T OF MOTOR VEH.,
2008 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA DUI MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM 71
(2008) (describing the "wet reckless" offense in California).
112 It is tempting to assimilate the wet reckless into standard practice by treating it
as an offense (reckless driving) with an integrated sentencing enhancement (the
consumption of drugs and alcohol). While only a fine line distinguishes crimes from
crime-enhancement combinations, the wet reckless is probably best classified as a
distinct crime, or at least, a distinct plea that is commonly regarded as connoting
both a separate offense and unique consequences. As discussed in the text above,
prosecutors cannot allege a wet reckless, a fact that distinguishes this crime from
crime-enhancement combinations recognized under California law. Also unlike an
enhancement, the "wet" aspect of the offense cannot be submitted to ajury; it springs
into existence only in a plea bargain. Furthermore, the parties have almost plenary
authority to decide the quantum of drugs or alcohol in the driver's system that will
implicate the wet reckless charge; no amount categorically implicates the offense, or
(above zero) precludes its use.
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conviction for "conventional" reckless driving is now described as a "dry"
183
reckless) . This "wet reckless" label most closely describes a defendant's
plea, but it also connotes, in a rough sense, the criminal conduct for
which he or she has been convicted. In short, as a matter of both
parlance and practice, "wet reckless" describes not only an outcome, but
also an offense.
The wet reckless is not only a distinct crime; it is also a distinctive
one. Because the crime is summoned by courtroom actors, it cannot be
invoked at any stage of a criminal proceeding prior to plea bargaining. A
police officer cannot arrest or cite someone for a wet reckless (though
they can, of course, arrest a suspect for DUI, or for regular reckless
driving), and a prosecutor cannot allege a wet reckless in an initial
charging instrument. Nor is the wet reckless available to the parties as a
lesser included offense at trial; indeed, the offense can never be proved
through trial. The crime only comes into play in the course of plea
negotiations, in which both the defendant and the state must consent to
1814its application.
Notwithstanding its idiosyncrasies, the wet reckless has proven
extremely effective in generating plea bargains in DUI cases. Though the
legislative intent behind AB 348 may have been to deter plea bargaining,
the wet reckless has had the opposite effect by giving the parties in DUI
cases an additional compromise settlement option that carries penalties
greater than those affixed to a conviction for "dry" reckless driving, but
less than those associated with a DUI conviction. Illustrating the point,
California arrests for DUI in 2005 led to 136,591 convictions for driving
under the influence, 14,452 wet reckless convictions, and only 2,890 dry
reckless convictions. 1 5 Data from earlier years reveal a comparable
proportion of wet reckless convictions in DUI cases.18
The frequent invocation of the wet reckless in California courtrooms
suggests, if nothing else, that a distinctive sanction, tethered to a
particular brand of misconduct or sequence of events, can be seen and
accepted as a crime even if the sanction is categorically divorced from
significant portions of the continuum of conventional criminal
procedures. Indeed, individual defendants charged with driving under
... See California DUI-Wet and Reckless Reduced Charge, DULcom (Feb. 3, 2008),
http://www.dui.com/dui-library/california/penalties-fines/wet-reckless.
'" The "wet reckless" cannot be inserted into a case as a lesser included offense
to driving under the influence of alcohol, since under California law, reckless driving
is not a lesser included offense of DUI. People v. McGrath, 271 P. 549, 550-51 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1928).
TASHIMA & DAOUD, Supra note 181, at 19.
86 Similar data for the period spanning the years 1990 to 2000 show that DUI
arrests led to approximately twice as many wet reckless convictions than convictions
for dry reckless driving, with the number of wet reckless convictions consistently
hovering between 10% to 13% of the number of DUI convictions. HELEN N. TASHIMA
& CLIFFORD J. HELANDER, CAL. DEP'T OF MOTOR VEH., 2002 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
CALIFORNIA DUI MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM, at i (2002).
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the influence likely welcome the existence of the wet reckless and the
plea agreements it inspires. But the wet reckless and other facilitating
crimes may harm defendants generally, even if they seem to benefit the
parties in particular cases. The next section of this Article discusses the
possible hidden costs of the wet reckless, other pleading crimes, and
detention and charging offenses.
VI. THE PERILS OF FACILITATING CRIMES
The preceding discussion assumes that detention, charging, and
pleading crimes are of more than merely academic interest. This
assumption might be unwarranted if these crimes had no substantial
positive or negative effect on the administration of criminal justice. As
related below, however, facilitating crimes and the practices that produce
those offenses may present problems that are different in both degree
and kind from those associated with other crimes. Detention crimes are
so inexpensive to administer that powerful incentives exist to create
them; meanwhile, the manner in which these crimes are used tends to
shield them from scrutiny. Charging crimes suggest a fundamental
insincerity in the substantive criminal law. And, since they are insulated
from challenge by the bargains they facilitate, pleading crimes may be
almost entirely untethered from reality, lacking factual predicates that
correspond to conventional understandings of unlawful, or at least
undesirable, conduct.
A. Detention Crimes and Overcriminalization
Many commentators believe that modern American criminal law
criminalizes too much, and punishes too harshly.17 This situation, it is
argued, is counterproductive to the rule of law because at some point the
elasticity and overexpansion of criminal laws compromises their
integrity." Critics of "overcriminalization" also decry an alleged absence
of adequate notice," the high costs of enforcement, "o the vast authority
that the perceived surfeit of criminal laws confers upon police and
87 E.g., HusAK, supra note 20, at 3 ("[TJhe most pressing problem with the
criminal law today is that we have too much of it."). As one commentator has
observed, "The academic consensus is that federal criminal law .. . includes too many
offenses . . . and covers too many people within the scope of its sanctions. The
criminal law of the states has also been charged with being bloated and rapacious,
although there the consensus may be weaker." Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of
Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1491, 1497-98 (2008) (footnote omitted).
' HUSAK, supra note 20, at 12 (observing that "[a]s the scope of criminal liability
expands, stigma is depleted and deterrence most likely is eroded," due to a lack of
respect for seemingly inappropriate criminal prohibitions).
' E.g., id. at 11 ("Because of the number and complexity of criminal statutes ...
potential lawbreakers may not receive adequate notice of their legal obligations.").
" E.g., id. at 12.
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prosecutors,191 and the possible "chilling effect" that broad criminal laws
may have on law-abiding conduct, even when they are rarely enforced.192
The persistent use of a crime to generate only detentions, without
subsequent prosecution, may exacerbate these problems. More
specifically, while detention crimes may effectuate the basic goals
associated with a prohibition more inexpensively than would either a civil
detention scheme or a "traditional" criminal offense that is prosecuted to
conviction or acquittal in the normal course of events, this comparative
advantage may lead to ever-broader criminal sanctions that implicate
many of the aforementioned perils of "overcriminalization."
As compared to civil detention schemes, detention crimes carry the
advantage of a built-in set of rules that govern the permissibility of
detentions and arrests. These rules are already well understood by police
officers, the persons typically tasked with enforcing these prohibitions.
Civil detention schemes, by comparison, must be developed on an ad hoc,
case-by-case basis. Given the above, when forced to choose between
criminalizing a particular form of conduct and making this behavior
subject to a civil detention scheme, legislatures have strong incentives to
pursue the former course. Meanwhile, as compared to "traditional"
criminal offenses, detention crimes rarely lead to expensive judicial
proceedings, or the even more pricey application of punishment.1 9 5 In a
perverse twist, this lack of prosecutions likely leads to a broader universe
of criminal laws than would otherwise be the case, since the restrained
application of detention crimes encourages legislatures to criminalize
E.g., id. at 13.
1 John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law
Models-And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1881 (1992) (commenting
upon the "additional costs" of overcriminalization, "including the fear and anxiety
imposed on risk-averse individuals forced to live under the constant threat of
draconian penalties").
" See Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, supra note 10, at 7-9
(discussing how civil liability schemes can lead to unpredictable results).
1" On the subject of noncriminal detentions generally, and the range of
detention schemes specifically, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL
LAw 25 (1998) (discussing a variety of detention schemes that are regarded as civil,
not criminal, in nature). See also D. A. Cox, Right, WithoutJudicial Proceeding, To Arrest
and Detain One Who Is, Or Is Suspected of Being, Mentally Deranged, 92 A.L.R.2d 570, 571-
72 (1963); Carrie Lacey, Abuse of Quarantine Authority: The Case for a Federal Approach to
Infectious Disease Containment, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 199, 203-11 (2003).
.. Detention crimes also are "cheap" in a political sense. Detentions tend to take
place only when an officer observes reasonable suspicion of a crime and decides to
investigate. Accordingly, detentions tend to be concentrated either on the highways,
or in high-crime neighborhoods where police officers tend to be stationed. With
traffic stops, a detention can always be justified on public-safety grounds, which
represent a relatively noncontroversial basis for an encounter. The residents of high-
crime neighborhoods, meanwhile, may not possess the political capital necessary to
challenge the policies that encourage such stops, even assuming that they have the
desire to do so.
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conduct that might be too expensive to prohibit if offenses were
routinely prosecuted to conviction. 9 6
The manner in which detention crimes are utilized also tends to
limit the ability of the judiciary to test their validity and monitor their
use. Many detention crimes escape meaningful review by the courts
because they rarely form the basis for a prosecution of a criminal
defendant, in which case they would be subject to headlong attack.
Instead, a criminal defendant typically has an incentive to attack the
validity of an uncharged detention offense only when it enables an
investigation that leads to other charges. In this context, however, the
"good-faith" exception to the exclusionary rule may insulate the
detention crime from scrutiny.'9 7 Under the good-faith exception, when
an officer reasonably relies on a statute or ordinance in conducting a
search or seizure, the seized evidence will not be subject to the
exclusionary rule even if the statute or ordinance would be found
unconstitutional if subjected to direct review.'98 At least in circumstances
where the constitutionality of the detention crime is unclear, the
exception allows a court to avoid any ruling on the validity vel non of the
uncharged offense. The good-faith exception thus provides detention
crimes with a layer of protection that other, more frequently charged
offenses lack.
The recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit in United States v. Cardenas-Alatorre'99 illustrates the effect
that the good-faith exception has on judicial review of detention crimes.
The defendant in Cardenas-Alatorre, a motorist driving along Highway 40
outside of Albuquerque, was pulled over by a sheriffs deputy.20 The
deputy had perceived that the license plate frame on Cardenas-Alatorre's
vehicle obscured a trivial part of the registration sticker on the license
plate underneath.20' The deputy believed that the stop was valid under a
New Mexico state law providing that a vehicle license plate must be
"clearly visible [ ] and .. . free from foreign material and in a condition to
11 See Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, supra note 10, at 10
(discussing the incentives that exist for legislatures to create broad detention crimes).
'9' See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1987).
"' Id. See also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921-22 (1984) (applying the
good-faith exception in connection with a defective warrant). The exception does not
apply when "in passing the statute, the legislature wholly abandoned its responsibility
to enact constitutional laws" or if the provisions of the statute or ordinance "are such
that a reasonable officer should have known that the statute was unconstitutional."
Krull, 480 U.S. at 355.
' 485 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2007).
m Id. at 1112.
20' id.
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be clearly legible, 202-arguably, a detention crime. A subsequent
investigation conducted by the officer yielded methamphetamine.20 s
When federal drug charges were filed against Cardenas-Alatorre, he
responded with a motion to suppress.m In his motion, Cardenas-Alatorre
argued that the New Mexico law was unconstitutionally vague, at least as
applied to him.2 The district court disagreed, and the court of appeals
206
affirmed. The appellate court recognized that in the usual case,
evidence that is seized pursuant to a search conducted under the
authority of an unconstitutional statute must be suppressed.20' The court
of appeals went on to recognize and apply the good-faith exception to
this general rule, however. Parsing the New Mexico statute, the panel
found that one reasonable interpretation of the law plainly forbade even
minimal obstructions, such as the license plate holder. The existence of
this plausible interpretation of the law that comported with
constitutional standards meant that Cardenas-Alatorre's motion to
suppress failed.210 At the same time, the appellate court cautioned that
"nothing in our analysis on this score is meant to prejudge whether a
vagueness challenge to the New Mexico law shouldn't or wouldn't
ultimately succeed."2 1' But since Cardenas-Alatorre wasn't charged with
the equipment violation, the court had no occasion to decide whether
the law was, in fact, unduly vague. The detention crime remained on the
books, whereas a conventional, charged offense might not have survived.
B. The Insincerity of Charging Crimes
Charging crimes, meanwhile, provide cause for concern insofar as
they imply a lack of sincerity in the criminal sanction. The chronic use of
a crime to facilitate a plea, without a concomitant interest in securing a
conviction for the offense, connotes a disinterest in enforcing theconviction frteofne ontsadsneeti nocn h
underlyin proscription that calls the validity of the prohibition itself into
question.
While this sincerity issue looms over the practice of plea bargaining
generally, it casts an especially dark shadow upon charging crimes. A
202 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN § 66-3-18(A) (1978) (1998
N.M. Laws, Ch. 48, § 4 (effective July 1, 1998) (amended 2005, 2007)).
20' Id. at 1113.
204 Id.
"0 Id.
2 Id. at 1113, 1120.
217 Id. at 1114.
208 Id. at 1114-15.
2 Id. at 1115.
210 Id. at 1115-16.
211 Id. at 1116.
2" The non-enforcement of detention crimes may raise similar issues, but the
serious nature of many charging offenses, as evidenced by the punishments attached
to these crimes, makes the tactical use of these charges particularly troubling.
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prosecutor who initially insists on a five-year sentence for a crime, with
the ultimate goal of procuring a three-year term through plea
negotiations, might be described as having proffered an "insincere"
initial settlement offer. Yet when it becomes common knowledge that an
offense represents a bargaining chip, the whole criminal sanction itself
becomes intertwined with the subterfuge . Put another way, the
dismissal of a crime for tactical reasons in a large percentage of cases in
which it is invoked raises the question of whether the crime amounts only
to a vehicle for inducing convictions for other crimes as to which proof
beyond a reasonable doubt may be lacking, and calls into doubt whether
the government truly values the interests protected by the charging
offense.
214These problems are, on balance, worsened by the fact that
charging crimes often carry severe penalties. In this respect, charging
crimes belie the rational assumption that offenses that are assigned the
most serious punishments also merit the most sincere prosecution-not
only because these penalties connote that the misconduct in question
produces substantial social harms, but also because the stiff consequences
of conviction dictate an honest, consistent commitment to pursue and
punish true offenders. For example, the continuing criminal enterprise
crime proscribed by 21 U.S.C. § 848(a), with its mandatory minimum
term of 20 years in prison, 215 has been described as a powerful weapon in
the federal government's campaign against drug traffickin .21 1 While
several drug kingpins have been convicted of this offense, the data
discussed in Section IV, supra, also indicate that this crime is frequently
dismissed pursuant to plea bargains. This pattern prompts the question
of whether § 848(a) represents a powerful tool principally because it
21 At least insofar as the crimes carry mandatory or customary sentences,
charging crimes also concentrate power with the prosecution. Use of these offenses
limits the ability of a defendant to obtain a more lenient sentence than that desired
by the prosecutor by pleading guilty to the crimes charged, and then relying on the
judge to issue a forgiving sentence. Furthermore, to the extent that charging crimes
implicate a "going rate" in which certain crimes are customarily pled down to lesser
offenses, these charges also aggravate the already existing chasm between courtroom
"insiders" such as prosecutors and defense attorneys, who are presumably aware of
the going rate, and "outsiders" such as defendants and the lay public, who may not
possess similar knowledge. See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in
Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 911, 912-913 (2006).
"' The "on balance" caveat reflects the fact that these crimes often implicate
types of misconduct that clearly represent proper subjects of the criminal laws. This
relationship to other, viable crimes tends to suggest a basic sincerity behind the
general prohibition effectuated, if not directly realized, by the charging offense.
2.. 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (2006).
26 Mark J. Kadish, Rosalyn Suna Kadish & Alan J. Baverman, The Continuing
Criminal Enterprise Statute: A Powerful Weapon for Federal Prosecutors, 19 TRIAL 66, 66
(1983).
217 See, e.g., United States v. Edmond, 52 F.3d 1080, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(affirming notorious Washington, D.C. drug kingpin Rayful Edmond's conviction
under 21 U.S.C. § 848(b) for leading a continuing criminal enterprise).
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produces convictions on its own terms, or because it coerces defendants
into accepting plea bargains to other charges (and, 2ossibly, into
promising to testify against one's former co-conspirators) . If the latter,
the crime raises concerns regarding the extent to which the substantive
criminal law may be used for instrumental purposes.
C. Pleading Crimes and the Limits of the Criminal Sanction
Like charging crimes, pleading offenses raise nettlesome issues
regarding the permissible purposes and limits of the criminal sanction.
To frame this point as it relates to pleading crimes, consider the
following hypothetical state crime:
Section o. Offense X.
Upon stipulation of the parties and approval by the court, any
individual charged with a crime carrying a minimum punishment of
no less than three years in prison may enter a plea of guilty or no
contest to this offense. A conviction for this offense shall be
described solely as a conviction for "Offense X." Any person
convicted of Offense X shall serve no less than two, and no more
than three, years in prison.
If enacted, Offense X very well might survive or evade judicial
scrutiny; several courts have rejected motions by defendants to set aside
pleas to fictitious crimes that were not originally charged by the
prosecution (for obvious reasons), but invoked as lesser offenses by the
parties for plea-bargaining purposes.21 Given the arguable viability of the
statute, at least in light of the posture in which its constitutionality is
likely to be presented to the courts, the question becomes whether it is
desirable to have this pleading crime-and others like it-within the
criminal code.
The answer to this question might be "yes" if one were to ask a
defendant charged with a crime carrying a penalty in excess of three
years in prison. To this person, a plea to Offense X, with its maximum
custodial term of three years, might seem like an attractive alternative to
a trial involving, and conviction for, the greater offense. This defendant
.. Kadish, Kadish & Baverman, supra note 216, at 68 (Section 848 "is not
necessarily being used to net the 'big fish'; yet, because of the statute's broad
language, harsh penalties, and liberal construction, the drug task forces can use it for
leverage against mid-range defendants in a typical drug conspiracy, in hopes of
getting these defendants to 'flip' against others in the 'organization.'").
. In Spencer v. State, 942 P.2d 646, 647-649 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997), the court
upheld a plea-bargained conviction to attempted aggravated battery, a crime that did
not exist under Kansas law. The court reasoned that the defendant had originally
been charged with a legitimate offense, and could not complain on appeal about the
terms of his freely entered-into bargain. For a discussion of Spencer and the handful of
other decisions that have confronted similar issues (often involving pleas to
"attempted voluntary manslaughter," and usually coming to the same conclusion as
the Spencer court), seeJoseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining, 75 TUL. L. REv. 695,
740-41 (2001).
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also might prefer to be convicted of Offense X to the extent that its
indistinct nature obscures the character of his or her alleged criminal
conduct, in much the same way that a conviction for a wet reckless likely
carries less stigma than that attached to a conviction for driving under
220
the influence of drugs or alcohol.
But these benefits may come at a very high price-if not to the
defendant described above, then to others like him in as-yet-unfiled
cases. One reason is that the existence of pleading crimes may encourage
overreaching by prosecutors. If a criminal code contains not only Offense
X, but also other pleading crimes (e.g., Offense A, B, C, D, etc.), each
with its own punishment terms, prosecutors might file charges they
would otherwise reject. Imagine a case in which there exists an 11%
chance of conviction on the sole charge, which carries a sentence of ten
years. Assuming that the prosecutor can foresee the unlikelihood of
success, normally this case would and should be rejected. The prosecutor
might find this case more attractive, however, if there also exists a generic
pleading option that carries a maximum penalty of one year in jail. In
this situation, a rational defendant whose only concern relates to time
served might plead guilty to the lesser charge rather than go to trial on
the greater offense. An ethically suspect prosecutor might anticipate
222
this thought process and file the case.
Perhaps more significantly, a crime such as Offense X would tug at
the very fabric of the criminal sanction. Offense X lacks any factual
2 This "blurring" of the defendant's misconduct is itself troubling. As one
commentator has observed: "[11f the plea to an unreal reduced charge (or to a
hypothetical offense) is accepted by the judge-as it is in most cases-the crime of
which the defendant stands convicted has little or no relation to what he actually did
and has a distorting effect on the criminal justice system. The criminal conviction
becomes a suspect unit of analysis for counting crimes, for making restitution awards,
for parole, and for sentencing guidelines. In the absence of an accurate plea, officials
find themselves searching for the 'real' offense concealed behind the fictional plea in
an attempt to restore the proper fit between the sanction and the charge, between
the sentence and the purpose of sentencing-whether it is 'just deserts,' restitution,
rehabilitation, or vengeance. As a result, the public comes to assume that convictions
for lesser offenses invariably mask greater ones." Abraham S. Goldstein, Converging
Criminal Justice Systems: Guilty Pleas and the Public Interest, 49 SMU L. REV. 567, 575
(1996). See also King, supra note 39, at 166-70 (discussing how the parties to criminal
cases may reach plea bargains that may satisfy their interests, but compromise broadly
held values).
2' Of course, defendants aren't always, or even usually, perfectly rational in this
regard. See generally Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117
HARv. L. REV. 2463 (2004).
m In theory, the judge stands in the way of pleas to crimes that are unsupported
by the facts of a case. In reality, some judges do not take this obligation to heart. See
generally Byrne, supra note 3 (discussing the practice of accepting "baseless pleas").
Furthermore, many courts permit pleas without a factual basis for the crime of
conviction, provided that a factual basis exists for a conviction of the more substantial
crime that was originally charged. Id. at 2987-88.
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223
predicates that correspond to conventional understandings of harmful,
blameworthy, or even merely undesirable conduct. The purported crime
involves no prohibition, no rule; only a consequence.
While Offense X represents a flight of fancy, the problems it poses
224
also appear with the wet reckless and other pleading crimes. Indeed, a
common characteristic of a pleading crime is a disconnect between the
proscribed conduct and conventional notions of criminal behavior that
needs to be punished and deterred-otherwise, the offense presumably
would be charged more often in the first instance. Some of these crimes
differ from Offense X only in that they have been varnished with some
conceivable connection to another crime or a category of crimes (as with
the wet reckless and DUI offenses, or 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) and drug
trafficking crimes), a linkage that limits their ability to wreak mischief by
cabining the range of cases in which the parties can plausibly invoke the
offense. Even so, these crimes raise troubling questions regarding the
acceptable boundaries of the criminal laws.
D. Facilitating Crimes, Procedure, and Legitimacy
Finally, a perception of illegitimacy surrounds all three categories of
facilitating crimes. This perception owes to the pervasive influence of
the procedural continuum in shaping beliefs regarding the "proper"
administration of criminal offenses.
Detention and charging crimes appear flawed, relative to other
offenses, because they do not lead to convictions and punishment, which
are relied upon in the normal course of events as final expressions of
community disapproval toward a defendant and his or her alleged
misbehavior. The absence of these expected consequences of a
"successful" prosecution connotes, rightly or wrongly, that these offenses
are being used for improper purposes, or at least that they are being
applied in an unsatisfactory way. A sense prevails that if a criminal offense
permits the intrusions associated with detention and charging, it should
also bring about convictions.
Pleading crimes implicate similar thinking, only in reverse. If a crime
implicates a social harm that is sufficiently serious that a criminal
m See Douglas Husak, Crimes Outside the Core, 39 TULSA L. REv. 755, 766 (2004)
(describing the "harm requirement" as "perhaps the most familiar attempt to narrow
the boundaries of the criminal law").
22 Cf Byrne, supra note 3, at 2991-95 (discussing ethical and other issues
associated with factually "baseless pleas," many of which involve pleas to pleading
crimes).
22 It is understood that "legitimacy" is a term packed with multiple meanings. See
generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARv. L. REv. 1787
(2005) (discussing three different conceptions of legitimacy). As used here,
"legitimacy" combines aspects of at least two of the three strands of legitimacy
identified by Fallon-"legal" legitimacy (essentially, lawfulness), id. at 1794, and
"moral" legitimacy (or "respect-worthiness"), id. at 1796.
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conviction may adhere to its commission, the intuition exists that it also
should encompass the lesser intrusions associated with arrest and
charging. When a crime leads to relatively few or no arrests, this lacuna
suggests that the offense falls out of step with the functions properly
assigned to the substantive criminal law.
As the bulk of this Article has described, these impressions are at war
with the realities surrounding the administration of the criminal laws,
circumstances that encourage the production and use of facilitating
crimes. Instead of attacking these conditions head-on, the next, and final,
section of this Article considers instead whether political energies might
be redirected toward the recognition and application of facilitating
crimes that might decrease, instead of abet, overcriminalization.
VII. CONCLUSION: THE PROMISE OF FACILITATING CRIMES
The discussion above establishes that facilitating crimes present
significant challenges, and cause for some concern. At a minimum, it
makes sense to keep track of how particular crimes are used by police
and prosecutors so as to ascertain their status as detention, charging, or
pleading offenses. This data could then be used during periodic reviews
of the criminal code, audits of police practices, or other inquiries into
the administration of the criminal laws. For example, if data reveal that a
particular crime is almost invariably dismissed pursuant to plea
negotiations, this would suggest that the offense is either superfluous,
defective, or being used as a charging crime.
At the same time, the pivotal insight that follows from an awareness
of facilitating crimes-that it is not always necessary for a particular crime
to intersect with all portions of the continuum of criminal procedures in
order for the offense to serve the purpose(s) assigned to it-might carry
some useful implications, as well. To this point, this Article has focused
on reasons why police and prosecutors might want to avoid certain
segments of the procedural continuum. Perhaps other perspectives also
should be taken into account. Just as some procedures are deemed too
costly to law enforcement insofar as they relate to certain crimes, so too
might unnecessary burdens on criminal defendants, suspects, and others
outside of law enforcement be avoided by tailoring some crimes to avoid
portions of the procedural continuum.
For example, jurisdictions might recognize more "opt-out" crimes.
An "opt-out" crime would represent a minor offense as to which a
defendant could obtain a dismissal of the charge against him or her prior
to trial and conviction, as a matter of law, upon satisfaction of certain
prerequisites.2 The basic concept behind an "opt-out" offense informs
2 Brady, supra note 38, at 25 n.117 ("Jurisdictions often resort to conditional
dismissals of criminal cases. ... These dispositions enable defendants to avoid entry
of a conviction and . .. potential punishment if the defendants meet certain
conditions for a specified time.").
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existing "diversion" programs. With diversion, a case against a defendant
charged with a crime-usually a minor offense, such as small-scale drug
possession-may be "diverted" short of trial and conviction on the
condition that the defendant complete certain extra .udicial
requirements such as drug treatment or alcohol counseling. If the
defendant fails to meet these obligations, the case against him or her may
be reinstated.'2 In eneral, however, diversion remains a matter of
prosecutorial grace; this alternative is not categorically available to all
defendants charged with a particular offense.3 o
The modern trend is toward the broadened availability of diversion
and similar programs,2 and the day may be approaching when diversion
becomes a matter of right for defendants charged with a variety of minor
crimes.2 12 If so, this sort of "opt-out" crime would draw from the basic
facilitating-crime model by categorically avoiding portions of the
procedural continuum-at least if the defendant so chooses. A few
examples of "opt-out" infractions already exist; in California, a motorist
charged with failing to provide his or her driver's license upon the lawful
demand of a peace officer will get any resulting charge dismissed simply
by bringing the license to court and showing it to the judge.3 A similar
rule applies to the offense of failing to provide proof of automobile
.234insurance .
Diversion and "opt-out" crimes represent viable alternatives to
existing offenses only with regard to modest crimes as to which there
exists a minimal interest in punishing the offender.' Another, more
' NAT'L Assoc. OF PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCIES, PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND
GOALS FOR PRETRIAL DIVERSION/INTERVENTION 17 (2008) (discussing various
requirements commonly imposed on defendants as conditions of diversion).
221 See, e.g., John P. Bellassai, A Short History of the Pretrial Diversion of Adult
Defendants from Traditional Criminal justice Processing, Part One: The Early Years, 2,
http://www.napsa.org/publications/diversionhistory.pdf.
' JOHN CLARK, PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., PRETRIAL DIVERSION AND THE LAw: A
SAMPLING OF FOUR DECADES OF APPELLATE COURT RULINGS, at 11-2 to 11-9 (2006).
230 Bellassai, supra note 228, at 1; Brakel & South, supra note 21, at 124-25.
23' NAT'L ASSOC. OF PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCIES, PROMISING PRACTICES IN PRETRIAL
DIVERSION 33 (2010) (commenting on the growth of pretrial diversion as an
alternative to prosecution).
2 California's Proposition 36, for example, creates a route to expungement for
many non-violent drug offenders. However, this program requires a nominal
conviction as a prerequisite for participation in the treatment regimen that must be
completed as a condition of expungement. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1 (West Supp.
2011).
m CAL. VEH. CODE § 12951 (a) (West 2010).
234 CAL. VEH. CODE § 16028(e) (West 2000). See also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 41970 (West 2006) (providing for dismissal of charges that concern an unlawful
gasoline cargo tank upon the presentation in court of proof of correction of the
violations).
"5 This is not to say that diversion and similar alternatives to conventional
prosecution represent cure-alls for the problems associated with the traditional
manner of prosecuting minor offenses. Drug courts, in particular, have been both
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ambitious design would involve the replacement of some existing
offenses with "pure" pleading crimes on an "opt-in" basis. With this
approach, an offense incapable of providing grounds for an arrest or an
initial charge could be invoked by the defense either in connection with
a plea agreement (with the prosecutor's concurrence) or, possibly, as a
lesser included offense for the fact-finder's consideration at trial.
"Opt-in" crimes might represent preferable alternatives to some
existing offenses. In particular, "opt-in" crimes might provide useful
substitutes for certain types of crimes that have come under fire for
allegedly placing too much power in the hands of police and prosecutors
at the investigatory and charging phases of a criminal matter. "Ancillary"
crimes represent one class of offenses that might function better on an
"opt-in" basis. Ancillary crimes "function as surrogates for the
prosecution of primary or core crimes .... They are created mostly for
situations in which a defendant is believed to have committed a primary
or core offense, but prosecution is unlikely to be successful or is
otherwise thought to be undesirable.",3 6 Money-laundering crimes offer
an example of an ancillary offense under this definition. Prosecutorial
reliance on ancillary crimes has been attacked on the ground that this
emphasis "is likely to divert attention from, and downgrade the
importance of, [more] substantive crimes," and downplays "what should
be the main focus of the criminal law-the perpetration of harms."2 3 8
The commentator who affixed the "ancillary crimes" label to certain
offenses noted that "[t]he problems created by the expanded use of the
new ancillary offenses exist, in the first instance, because these crimes are
available to be used as a basis for criminal charges."239 Recognition of
facilitating crimes, especially pleading offenses, allows us to ask: what if
these crimes weren't available to be used as criminal charges, at least in
the first instance? What if existing ancillary crimes were retooled so that,
like the wet reckless, they could only form the basis for a negotiated plea,
or perhaps a lesser-included-offense instruction at trial? Might this
outcome be politically palatable, even if outright abolition of these
crimes is not?
The candid answer to the last question: probably not. "Opt-in"
crimes are too exotic to replace existing offenses, at least for the time
hailed as beneficial and decried as counterproductive. E.g., Josh Bowers,
Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REv. 783, 786 (2008); Eric J. Miller, Embracing
Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise ofJudicial Interventionism, 65 OHIO ST. L.J.
1479 (2004); Morris B. Hoffman, Commentary, The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L.
REV. 1437 (2000); Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team Am I on Anyway? Musings of a Public
Defender About Drug Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 37
(2000); John Feinblatt, Greg Berman & Aubrey Fox, Institutionalizing Innovation: The
New York Drug Court Story, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 277, 291-92 (2000).
2 HuSAK, supra note 20, at 40.
m See Abrams, supra note 113, at 17-18.
m Id. at 34.
2" Id. at 36.
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being. Yet these offenses still might serve a valuable purpose if
legislatures, when enacting new ancillary crimes, considered whether to
follow the facilitating-crime model instead of simply enacting
conventional crimes. The tight relationships between ancillary crimes
and "core" or primary offenses make the former natural candidates for
pleading-crime status. By definition, ancillary crimes bear a close
connection to at least one other offense, and commonly carry a penalty
that is somewhat less than that attached to the "core" crime. Limiting
ancillary crimes to "opt-in" status would maintain law enforcement's
initial investigatory focus on more substantive offenses, much as cases
that produce a wet reckless conviction remain, at their core, DUI
prosecutions. At the same time, the availability of ancillary offenses for
pleading purposes would trump any claim that legislatures or law
enforcement have entirely abandoned the interests purportedly
protected by these crimes.
True, this redesign of ancillary offenses might encourage
overzealous prosecutors to bring marginal cases that allege only core
charges, with the hope of ultimately eliciting a plea to an ancillary crime.
For this gambit to have any chance of success, however, there must be
some proof that the defendant committed the core offense. Otherwise,
depending on the mechanism by which cases are reviewed for probable
cause, either a grand jury will not return an indictment, or these charges
will not survive review by a magistrate. Moreover, a defendant can always
put the prosecution to its proofs as to the charged crimes, instead of
invoking the "opt-in" offense. And in any event, even assuming that there
exists some risk of improper conduct involving these "opt-in" ancillary
crimes, this outcome must be compared with the status quo. In a worst-
case scenario in which prosecutors routinely overcharge core offenses in
order to obtain a plea to an ancillary crime, there still must be a
significant quantum of proof that the defendant committed the core
offense for the defendant to find him- or herself in a position where he
or she might rationally admit to or otherwise invoke the "opt-in" crime.
Today, no such limitation exists on the invocation of ancillary offenses;
they may stand on their own, leading to more convictions and more
punishments for what are arguably ill-considered criminal charges.
To understand how this substitution might work, consider how it
would apply to the crime of possession of burglar's tools.no Though it
may be politically impossible to eliminate the crime altogether, it might
be palatable to retain the offense, but only as a pleading option (or a
lesser included offense) in burglary cases. Limiting the crime of
possession of burglar's tools in this manner would eliminate the prospect
of wrongful detentions and prosecutions for this offense, in which
240 This offense was chosen solely because it has been identified as an ancillary
offense, see Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, supra note 10, at 516; the
author expresses no opinion as to whether the offense represents an ideal candidate
for conversion to a facilitating crime.
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individuals who are detained, arrested or even prosecuted for this crime
in fact possessed the purported burglar's tools for entirely lawful reasons.
Meanwhile, retaining the crime as a pleading offense would preserve the
general condemnation of possession of burglar's tools with felonious
intent, and retain the possibility of punishment for those persons likely
also to have committed the more serious crime of burglary.
Even this limited acceptance of facilitating crimes may seem
heretical, given the prevailing sense that the basic architecture of
criminal procedure represents a perfect machine, with each cog and gear
of the continuum representing an essential part of the device. But if
some crimes are going to implicate only portions of the procedural
spectrum-and, like it or not, they are-it makes sense to consider how
to benefit from this fact. The forces that have created facilitating crimes
show no sign of abating. Perhaps it is time to exert more control over
their progeny, whether through abolition or embrace.
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